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CULTURAL PLURALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS
Kory Sorrell
t
A North-American Indian is well pleased with himself, and is honoured
by others, when he scalps a man of another tribe; and a Dyak cuts off
the head of an unoffending person, and dries it as a trophy. The murder
of infants has prevailed on the largest scale throughout the world, and
has met with no reproach; but infanticide, especially of females, has
been thought to be good for the tribe, or at least not injurious.- Charles
Darwin, The Descent of Man'
I don't mind being some kind of relativist, as long as I am not the kind
that renders individuals' or societies' moral self criticism incoherent, or
that declares intergroup or intercultural moral evaluation and criticism
impossible or forbidden. I do not think there are too few (or no) facts
pertinent to moral beliefs and their assessment, but that there are often
too many. I certainly do not think that "anything goes" at home or
• 2
elsewhere.- Margaret Walker, Moral Understandings
Since its adoption in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948, the concept of human rights has gained broad international
currency.' As Jack Donnelly points out, "All states regularly proclaim
J.D., Yale; Ph.D., Pennsylvania State; M.A., Fordham. This essay is dedicated to Vincent
Michael Colapietro, Josephine Carubia, and Maria Alicia Lopez Freeman, wonderful
friends and teachers. Special thanks go to W. Michael Reisman for improving this essay
through good conversation and trenchant criticism.
1. CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN 314 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed.,
1952).
2. MARGARET WALKER, MORAL UNDERSTANDINGS: A FEMINIST STUDY IN ETHICS 182
(1998).
3. This is not to say that there was no prior tradition of civil and political rights. The
British Magna Carta and Bill of Rights, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and
Citizen, and the United States Constitution and Declaration of Independence, made
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their acceptance of and adherence to international human rights norms,
and charges of human rights violations are among the strongest charges
that can be made in international relations., 4 The idea that human rights
are universal and provide the best available framework for constructing
common norms among nations and across cultures is rhetorically powerful
and attractive. It is deeply inclusive, providing a "picture" in which all
persons, however culturally and historically diverse, may recognize
themselves and see others as having something important in common with
them, their "humanity." It is also compelling insofar as persons who may
have little else in common may mutually recognize each other's needs,
aspirations, and sufferings. The rhetoric of universality and humanity thus
provides both basis and motive for international rights. By virtue of the
bare fact that one is human, one has rights to which one is entitled and
may enjoy free of constraint by other persons or institutions These rights
merit protection and, if threatened, other persons are obliged to intervene
or to assist on their behalf.
6
However appealing, the concept of universal rights is notoriously
problematic in practice. Even if all states recognize the existence of
international rights, there is controversy as to: (1) what those norms are or
should be, (2) exactly how they derive their justification from a concept of
human nature, (3) what counts as a violation of those recognized norms,
and (4) what is to be regarded as acceptable intervention or mediation.
And these questions are as important as they are thorny, since the answers
significant contributions. See HOWARD TOLLEY, JR., THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 1 (1987).
4. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (1989).
5. See Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, 20 HUM.
RTs. Q. 201, 203 (1998).
What is meant by human rights? To speak of human rights requires a
conception of what rights one possesses by virtue of being human. That
does not mean human rights in the self-evident sense that those who have
them are human, but rather, the rights that human beings have simply
because they are human beings and independent of their varying social
circumstances and degrees of merit.
Id.
6. Throughout this essay, "Right" is understood very thinly as follows:
[T]o say "X is entitled" or "X is obligated" is not to make a bare
statement of fact; each of these statements has a prescriptive dimension.
"X is entitled" means that she ought to be permitted to do or to have
whatever she is entitled to; "X is obligated" means that he ought somehow
to fulfill the obligation, to act so as to implement it or behave in such a
way as to show that he acknowledges it.
BETH J. SINGER, PRAGMATISM, RIGHTS, AND DEMOCRACY 26 (1999).
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not only limn the boundaries of individual and state power, but also
provide conditions under which some members of the international
community may justifiably intervene in the practices of other members of
the community on behalf of those whose rights they recognize as
threatened or suffering violation.7
The difficulty is now widely understood to lie in what is commonly
described as the problem of relativism or cultural pluralism. Although it is
prima facie apparent that all human beings have something in common
that may ground international norms, it proves difficult in practice to
identify what this underlying feature is. First, it is now broadly accepted as
empirical fact that different cultures embrace a broad range of values,
interpretive frameworks, and moral criteria in their respective "ways of
life" when discerning what practices are acceptable and which are not.
Different cultures rely on, and reproduce, narratives and practices that
privilege some values over others, explain those regnant hierarchies, offer
rules for resolving different sorts of conflict among competing values, as
well as locate decision-making authority among members of the
community in significantly different ways. What counts as acceptable
behavior, what marks the differences between, for example, pain and
pleasure, cruelty and discipline, rewarding initiation in a culture and
subjection by a culture, acts worthy of praise and those demanding censure
are all difficult to remove from the way of life that sustains and reproduces
it.8
Second, it is also important to note that value and practice are so
intertwined that one cannot separate them for comparison. What one
feels, enjoys, or disdains is tightly bound to the cultural practices in which
she is immersed. As John Dewey pointed out (and Freud before him),
impulses/instincts are indeterminate and starting points of assimilation.
"They are tentacles sent out to gather that nutrition from customs which
will in time render the infant capable of independent action." 9 And as
Herbert Marcuse made clear, even brutally oppressive systems gain
legitimacy and enjoyment by transforming the values of those it controls.
7. See Robert D. Sloane, Cultural Pluralism and Relativity: Understanding the
Universality of International Human Rights 3 (May 24, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the author).
8. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5 (1973). See generally
JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY,
LITERATURE, AND ART 21-54 (1988).
9. JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 68 (1988).
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The established values become the people's own values: adaptation
turns into spontaneity, autonomy; and the choice between social
necessities appears as freedom. In this sense, the continuing
exploitation is not only hidden behind the technological veil, but
actually 'transfigured.' The capitalist production relations are
responsible not only for the servitude and toil but also for the greater
happiness and fun available to the majority of the population - and they
deliver more goods than before.10
If Marcuse is right, then any appeal to human feeling as a basis for
criticism of a way of life becomes fraught with difficulties. Is someone in
pain because the practice of a culture is "inherently" a source of human
misery? Or is it part of the suffering required to produce the goods in
which the individual readily and with pleasure participates? Are not
tradeoffs like this made all the time by all cultures? Conversely, and this
will prove especially sticky later on in this essay, is the individual really
happy with his way of life? Or is the pleasure he takes a function of his
having internalized perverse ways of living? Can the individual be
extricated and, if so, would he really be better off? Would he, in the end,
agree with, and express gratitude for, the intervention? Given even what
little we know about culture and about human nature, the answers to these
questions are difficult to discern and their lack of resolution is an implicit
barrier to making claims about internationally acceptable norms of
conduct.
Finally, even very broad generalizations, such as a concept of the
"human" or of "rights," are now seen to reflect the values, analytical
frameworks, and habits of interpretation of the community that produces
them. As Donnelly points out:
Human rights represent a distinctive set of social practices, tied to
particular notions of human dignity, that initially arose in the modern
West in response to the social and political changes produced by
modern states and modern capitalist market economies. Most non-
Western cultural and political traditions, like the premodern West,
lacked not only the practice of human rights but also the very concept."
Part of the human rights discourse in the last twenty-five years has
been an attempt to show that other cultures do embrace a notion of human
rights that is significantly like that promoted by the West. It has been
argued, for example, that the Koran includes some universal fundamental
rights for all human beings; that traditional African societies include a
10. HERBERT MARCUSE, AN ESSAY ON LIBERATION 13 (1969).
11. DONNELLY, supra note 4, at 50.
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conception of human rights in their views of humanism; and that the
Chinese enjoyed the basic rights of man even though these rights were not
expressed in the language of human rights. 2 But Donnelly is careful to
show that these conceptions are intrinsically different insofar as they draw
their justifications from very different sources. They depend on, and draw
their content from, sacred texts, divine commandments, or other political
philosophies - not from the view (as does the West) that humans have
rights by virtue of their humanity only.13 This means that beyond the
differences in the details, i.e. what is the content and limitations of these
rights in each respective culture, the concepts are essentially different,
dependent on the culture which produced it, and thereby equally
susceptible to the charges of pluralism and relativism. What is understood
by a particular community as universal may be (some argue inevitably is)
actually quite provincial, undermining and marginalizing values and
arrangements that are essential or dear to members of communities
immersed in other ways of living.
4
Perhaps more important than these empirical facts is the epistemic
one that these differences often and easily escape notice. As Margaret
Walker suggests:
[W]e learn from and are taught by others to recognize what states of
others' souls are expressed in their comportment, gesture, visage, and
expression; and others must know what subjective states our
comportment, gesture, visage, and expression show, in order to teach us
12. Id. at 50-54.
13. Id.
14. This occurs not only, perhaps not even principally, when members of different
cultures are so far apart from one another as to be unable to recognize the limits of their
own representations vis-a-vis the representations of others, but also among members of the
same culture who have different and diverging understandings of what is shared and what is
not. Sandra Harding, for example, addressing relations between men and women in
western cultures, writes:
Women are thus excluded from men's conceptions of culture and its
conceptual schemes of "the social," "the historical," "the human." Finally,
women's actual experience of their own labor is incomprehensible and
inexpressible within the distorted abstractions of men's conceptual
schemes. Women are alienated from their own experience, for men's
conceptual schemes are also the ruling ones, which then define and
categorize women's experience for women.
SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM 156 (1986). See also NANCY
SCHEPER-HUGHES, DEATH WITHOUT WEEPING: THE VIOLENCE OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN
BRAZIL 478-504 (1992) (providing differing representations of Carnival in Brazil and
showing how each conceals relevant features of the events for, and from, differently located
participants).
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to name and describe our own psychological, emotional, or intentional
states.1
5
Without competent understanding of the code of recognition that
connects personal displays with meaning, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
grasp the meaning or significance of the practices in which others are
involved, much less evaluate those practices. This would not be a problem
if codes of recognition turned out to be quite similar, readily identifiable,
or easily learned. But as Walker suggests,
Expressions of respect, sadness, courtesy, anger, or shame may vary
significantly and globally between cultures, but often also vary
substantially among class or ethnic or age groups, or between males and
females, within the same culture. Even where expressions are native to
and spontaneous to human beings, such as smiles or certain reactions to
pain, there are still specific meanings attached to variations on these
displays and to the significance of the situations and interactions in
which they occur. There are polite smiles, demure smiles, seductive
smiles, angry smiles, greedy smiles, condescending smiles, leering smiles,
and pained ones. But which smiles are such, in which contexts, is not
the same everywhere, and is not something anyone is born knowing. It
must be learned from others in a particular social setting.
16
One must know a great deal about another's way of life in order to
interpret even relatively simple and broadly prevalent gestures. This
includes not only a range of context-specific rules of interpretation, but
also within any given culture, competing and diverging understandings and
use of those rules, as well as the changes that these have endured across
time. Cultural representations evolve, sometimes quite quickly, in
response to changing circumstance, to the inroads made by other cultures,
and even by chance.17 There appears, in short, practically no limit to what
is required in order to adequately grasp meanings generated by those
differently situated from us.
This is all relevant, of course, because in fashioning social norms that
are to be legitimately prescriptive across cultures, it is crucial to be able to
know and to mark boundaries between what is desirable and what is not,
what marks the difference between pain that is somehow warranted and
that which is not, what might count as an attractive change to a present
15. WALKER, supra note 2, at 182. See also W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF
ENCOUNTERS 105 (1999) (pointing out that power structures vary considerably depending
on context and that the indicia of those structures not only differ but may also be
significantly misleading).
16. Id. at 1.82-83.
17. See CLIFFORD, supra note 8, at 206-09.
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practice, and how a community may be justified in its intervention of
another community's or state's activities. Since there is such empirical
divergence, for international rights to succeed there must be some way to
choose among competing practices and it would seem that there must be
some way to distinguish really painful, harmful, exploitative, repressive
practices from those which only seem to be so due to differences in cultural
preferences and experience.
In light of these empirical conditions, the cultural pluralist/relativist
suggests that no such means may be gathered from the rhetoric of human
rights; that the appeal to universals is propped up by an essentially vacuous
notion of human nature; and that, because the content of this notion must
be filled by particular cultural understandings of the human, its use is
tantamount to the arbitrary imposition of some set of values on others who
do not share them. Indeed, the lodestar of international rights, a universal
humanism, turns out to be its own biggest obstacle. In order to understand
her better, it is important to see what the relativist - at least as she is
represented in this essay - is not saying. '8 First, this is not the sort of
relativism that is commonly characterized as "crude relativism" and
promptly dismissed. It does not hold, as John Tilley tersely describes one
form of cultural relativism, the proposition that "although for every culture
some moral judgments are valid, no moral judgment is universally valid.
Every moral judgment is culturally relative. ' ' 9 A common corollary to this
view is the further claim that, since judgments are relative, one should not
judge other cultures." This view is easily dismissed as self-referentially
inconsistent. On behalf of relativism it posits one universal descriptive
claim ("all judgments are relative") and one universal prescriptive claim
(members of cultural A are morally culpable if they censure members of
another culture B for not conforming to the mores of culture A).
Pluralism/relativism is also recognized as committing the naturalistic
fallacy. From a fact of pluralism it derives a particular norm of non-
interference. This is an unacceptable inference because it derives what
ought to be from what is. For both of these reasons (inconsistent and
fallacious), pluralism/relativism is not a defensible doctrine."
But the pluralist/relativist described above clearly does not hold this
view. First, she is not self-referentially inconsistent because she does not
18. Obviously, "relativism" has received numerous formulations. The one presented
here is introduced because I think it the most plausible.
19. John Tilley, Cultural Relativism, 22 HuM. RTS. Q. 501, 505 (2000).
20. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS: TEXT AND MATERIALS 193 (1996).
21. See Sloane, supra note 7, at 62.
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insist that every claim is relative. She only recognizes that different
cultures, and different persons within respective cultures, have a myriad of
different ways of living; that persons are to various degrees attached to
these choices; and that there are a broad range of narratives which justify
why different individuals and groups do things differently. The pluralist
sees this as an empirical fact that vexes attempts to choose "once and for
all" among competing ways of living, especially when past efforts to do so
have revealed themselves as concealing under the cover of universality
what are in fact quite specific preferences.
She also does not commit the naturalistic fallacy of moving from the
empirical fact of pluralism to the supposed corollary that judgment of
other cultures is categorically wrong. She claims only that the dominant
rhetoric of human rights cannot do the work required for the construction
of internationally binding social norms and expresses considerable
puzzlement about how this might be done. She recognizes, as does
Annette Baier, that the rights sustained within a community reflect the
values it holds, and that these are constantly balanced, adjusted, and
compromised. As Baier writes,
Different groups make different tradeoffs among the candidates for
universal rights. We in the late twentieth century give more weight to
the universal right to free expression than to what might well seem the
equally vital universal right to an unmolested childhood. We in effect
allow child pornography, and we even tolerate, in the name of freedom,
the market in sexual excitants in the form of so-called snuff movies,
which the purchasers believe, sometimes correctly, to have involved the
actual abuse, torture, and death of the involuntary child (and other)
"actors." Our current tradeoff of universal rights is as bizarre as was the
Shakers,' and seems almost to vindicate their belief that sex is the
devil.22
The question is not whether or not judgments may or should be made.
They obviously are and existential circumstances demand that they be
continually made - regardless of how haphazardly or clumsily. The
question is how to best make these decisions in a way that is non-arbitrary
and promotes a set of norms to which all participant members of the
international community may consent. Lists of international rights are
necessarily vague; how do we decide what their boundaries are? How do
we know when there has been a violation? And when may members of the
international community intervene? Does any form of child pornography
violate the rights of children or do only snuff-films? Are these legitimate
22. ANNETTE C. BALER, MORAL PREJUDICES: ESSAYS ON ETHICS 228 (1994).
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grounds for censure (dare one say intervention?) by the world community?
The pluralist/relativist, as I understand her, is both eager to protect
cultural difference from arbitrary imposition (even if it is well intended)
and exercises a healthy degree of skepticism with respect to the
approaches so far taken toward resolving these problems. But, and this is
the second feature that separates her from the crude relativist, she also
recognizes that some sort of accord must be found, some way of
adjudicating among competing practices and representations if
international rights are to maintain their legitimacy and widespread
currency.
In what follows, I carefully assess some recent efforts to address the
concerns alluded to above. Instead of broadly canvassing the extant
literature on human rights, the essay focuses in sections one and two on
recent approaches to developing, grounding, and discriminating legitimate
candidates for human rights. Each author has been chosen precisely
because she so ably represents the view she advocates and criticism is
aimed not at the particular writers, but at the methods each recommends.
One approach is provided by Martha Nussbaum, who draws on an
Aristotelian conception of human nature, and the other, introduced by
Laurie Shrage, suggests that a hermeneutic model is best for both
incorporating cultural pluralism and sorting out better from worse
practices. Although significant ground is gained by these strategies, I
argue that each is problematic (for different reasons) and I will introduce
in section three an alternative approach to the problem of international
rights. For reasons that will be made clear below, the term "universal" is
dropped because the rights claimed remain contingent, historical, and
fallible. The term "human" is also omitted because "humanity" does not
provide a non-relative foundation for the justification of particular
enumerated rights. But in exchange for this attenuated account of rights,
my approach offers means by which a pluralistic world community may
shape and give significant, even if limited, content to internationally
binding norms. Finally, in section four, I discuss my model in conjunction
with some actual conditions under which international rights may be
invoked. Although brief, this is intended to inspire some confidence in my
way of handling the problem.
20031
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I. CAPACITIES AS CULTURAL UNIVERSALS: A PLAUSIBLE
SOLUTION OR MORE "BAWLING ON PAPER?,
23
In Sex and Social Justice, Martha Nussbaum offers a new solution to
the problem of defending a conception of human rights in the face of
cultural pluralism and relativism. This approach may be the most plausible
of its kind, and a close look at the details will more specifically highlight
the difficulties that pluralism and relativism pose to the articulation of
international rights and show why approaches that start with human nature
are likely to fail.
A. Grounds for Cultural Universals and a Response to the
Pluralist/Relativist
Although her strategy is Aristotelian in nature, Nussbaum argues that
there are good empirical - rather than metaphysical - grounds for
supporting the view that there are universal conceptions of the human
found across cultures. She cites Aristotle to the effect that, "One may
observe in one's travels to distant countries the feelings of recognition and
affiliation that link every human being to every other human being." 5
Despite differences, human beings do much that is similar that is
recognizable by others who are not part of the particular culture that
provides the basis for claiming at least some very general cultural
universals.26
Nussbaum begins by asking an empirical question: "What activities
characteristically performed by human beings are so central that they seem
definitive of a life that is truly human? 2 7 The answers to this question
form the basis of a list of "Central Human Functional Capabilities.
' 28
23. This is Jeremy Bentham's assessment of natural rights discourse. Bentham writes
that, "Right is a child of law; from real laws come real rights, but from imaginary law, from
laws of nature, come imaginary rights .... Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and
imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, - nonsense upon stilts." See Shestack, supra
note 5, at 208 n.16.
24. This is one of the ways Nussbaum's account differs from Marx's more classically
metaphysical approach. Instead of empirical grounds, Marx drew on Aristotle's concepts of
freedom and essence in order to develop a notion of "species being" and alienation. See
KARL MARX, SELECTED WRITINGS 82 (1977) [hereinafter SELECTED WRITINGS]; KARL
MARX, CAPITAL: VOL. 1 546-48, 716 (1977) [hereinafter CAPITAL].
25. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 38 (1999).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 39.
28. Id. at 41. This is the other significant way in which Nussbaum departs from earlier
attempts to appropriate from Aristotle a method for producing human rights. Typically,
rights are discussed in terms of "needs." Marx, for example, argued that human beings are
[Vol. 10.2
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Among them are "life, bodily health, free exercise of emotions and
practical reason, play, and control over one's environment." 29 The list is
deliberately quite general, according to Nussbaum, so that "[e]ach of its
components can be more concretely specified in accordance with one's
origins, religious beliefs, or tastes".30 But widespread observation still
secures the cultural universals needed to provide the foundation for
international rights because different cultures do not disagree with respect
to what functions they characteristically have; they only differ in their• 31
manner of expression. Since it cannot be determined in advance which of
these capacities will be exercised by a particular culture, in what manner,
or to what degree, Nussbaum argues that only the capacity, not its exercise,
must be protected .
In developing her view, Nussbaum identifies three challenges that
pluralists and relativists pose to universalism and argues that her approach
can handle them. First, Nussbaum suggests that pluralists are worried that
her approach neglects historical and cultural differences. People
understand life in very different ways across cultures and any attempt to
mark universals will "enshrine" the understanding of a dominant group at
the expense of a minority one.3 3 Nussbaum thinks her approach handles
this easily. She claims that her "normative conception of human capability




The list of basic capacities is general precisely so that it may gain content
from persons located in specific cultures. Moreover, the list is not
intended to be exhaustive; it simply marks some important functions on
which we can agree and on which we can focus political action."
The second charge posed by pluralists is that universalism neglects the
autonomy of other people. It determines in advance what elements of
essentially incomplete unless they express themselves in nature and so "need" this
relationship. See SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 24, at 104. Nussbaum presumably
eschews this approach because it is notoriously difficult to decide which needs are primary
or how many there may be - if any beyond basic sustenance.
29. NUSSBAUM, supra note 25, at 41.
30. Id. at 40.
31. Even though Nussbaum insists that her approach is not metaphysical in nature, this
is a peculiarly Aristotelian metaphysical formulation: an abstract form becomes
determinate by its combination with some particularity. This should make one wonder how
this happens, as well as what exactly the general term "contains" on its own prior to its
becoming particular - in short, it invokes all of the problems that have vexed attempts to
defend realism (and universals) from nominalism since the 13th century.
32. Id. at 43.
33. Id. at 38.
34. Id. at 47.
35. Id.
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human life are important, projecting the values of some on others, and
preventing others from choosing what form of life is best for them
according to their own historical and cultural lights." Nussbaum thinks
this charge fails for much the same reason as the first one. Her approach,
far from neglecting this possibility, turns on the fact that various persons
and groups will give broadly different content to the norms she provides.
Indeed, it is self-referentially built into the list. Persons must have the
capacity to exercise their practical reason, by which Nussbaum means that
they must be free "to form a conception of the good and to engage in
critical reflection about the planning of one's own life.' The only
limitation imposed on persons is that these capacities are to be protected
broadly. Everyone has the right to exercise these capacities freely.
Consequently, one cannot exercise one's own capacities in a way that
impinges on those of others and one should protect the rights of others to
exercise their capacities in equally free ways.
Finally, pluralists seem to worry that a universal conception of the
human may be applied arbitrarily in the sense that only some persons will
be granted human status. Historically, the powerless, such as women or
slaves, were not considered fully human. Consequently, they would not
qualify for the protection offered under the rubric of human capacities.
Nussbaum thinks that this charge has merit, that Aristotle himself was
guilty of this practice, but that the problem is quite contingent and may be
addressed. Indeed, she thinks that the conception of the "human" has
been instrumental over time in showing up these arbitrary applications.
By recognizing that others are truly of the same kind, that "they" are no
less human than "we" are, the concept has provided a powerful source of
moral claims of injustice. 9 The powerful try to mark these sorts of
distinctions, but a universal conception of the human forestalls it.
According to Nussbaum, "to deny humanness to beings with whom one
36. Id. at 38.
37. NUSSBAUM, supra note 25, at 41.
38. See SINGER, supra note 6. This follows from a very general definition of rights and
gives content to Nussbaum's claim that "reasonable" pluralism is acceptable in her view.
Nussbaum claims that:
The approach is therefore very close to Rawl's approach using the notion
of primary goods .... The primary difference between this capabilities
list and Rawls's list of primary goods is its length and definiteness, and in
particular its determination to place on the list the social basis of several
goods that Rawls has called "natural goods," such as "health and vigor,
intelligence and imagination."
Id. at 45.
39. Id. at 50.
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lives in conversation and interaction is a fragile sort of self-deceptive
stratagem, vulnerable to sustained and consistent reflection, and also to
experiences that cut through self-deceptive rationalization.,4 Though the
notion of the human has been misapplied over time, it also provides the
means, according to Nussbaum, for correcting these mistakes (or arbitrary
expressions of power). Consequently, the record provided by rhetoric
based on human nature is grounds for ongoing hope, not the dismay
suggested by the pluralist/relativist.
B. Further Criticism: Significant Grounds for Concern
Even if a capacities approach admirably accommodates some
objections that a pluralist might have, there are others Nussbaum does not
appear to notice. First, this normative view is less empirical than it seems.
Although she claims to begin with observations of human nature revealed
through travel, Nussbaum clearly frames the inquiry in terms of the long-
standing debate between universalism and anti-essentialism - a concern
specific to western philosophical discourse. The question, for her, is
whether there are cross-cultural universals that apply everywhere and
always or do different cultures truly have nothing in common. This is
important, she thinks, because in order for some judgments to be binding
on all, regardless of cultural difference, there must be universal ground to
stand on. Otherwise, no culture may legitimately judge another.
This is problematic, not because it claims something in common which
is not, but because this way of framing the discussion inevitably sets the
stage for the horns of an unnecessary dilemma. This approach forces one
to choose: either universals in common and non-arbitrary judgment is
possible, or no universals and no cross-cultural judgment is legitimate.
And the career of the philosophical discourse has been the argument
between these choices, neither of which is satisfactory. It also forestalls a
far more fruitful inquiry. It fails to look at how persons actually go about
making judgments, some of which are inevitably cross-cultural.
Presumably, when Aristotle traveled, he made such judgments (what else
are recognitions, if not a kind of judgment?) and others formed opinions of
him, of his character, of what was due him, and what should legitimately be
expected of him as a stranger to their parts. Likewise, in our pluralistic
society, we constantly find ourselves in situations where such judgments
must be made, negotiated, informed, and continuously transformed. All of
this goes on, it would seem, without recourse to a philosophical doctrine of
universality, and more or less well at that. How this actually happens is an
40. Id.
2003]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
empirical question that should inform the further consideration, which is
normative, of how these practices of judgment may be improved.
Unfortunately, when framed as a choice between universality and strict
pluralism/relativism, this question remains beyond the domain of the
discussion. I will suggest below that it is crucial and provides a helpful
thread for finding our way through some of these difficulties.
Second, Nussbaum successfully avoids the metaphysical features of
traditional accounts of human nature by drawing her cultural universals
from observation. She also avoids the naturalist fallacy because she does
not rely on these "empirical universals" as a basis for normative
agreement. She does not misstep by concluding that, since these functions
are in common, they should be protected. Nevertheless, expression of
these faculties is considered a good, and this normative step must come
from somewhere. Nussbaum recognizes it as premise to her discussion
when she writes that:
The basic intuition from which the capability approach starts, in the
political arena, is that human capabilities exert a moral claim that they
should be developed .... We believe that certain basic and central
human endowments have a claim to be assisted in developing, and exert
that claim on others, and especially, as Aristotle saw, on government.
Without some such notion of the basic worth of human capacities, we
have a hard time arguing for women's equality and for basic human
rights.4'
Basic human worth is a sine qua non for justification, but Nussbaum
does not indicate how this worth is in turn to be grounded. Moreover, she
does not suggest how this notion is expected to trump other interests that a
group of persons may have.
Consider, for example, Carl Schmitt's view of politics as a conflict
between those who identify with one another against strangers, a conflict
whose final arbiter is power. According to Schmitt, "each has to decide for
himself whether in the concrete situation the otherness of the stranger
signifies the negation of his own way of life so that he has to be fended off
and fought in order to preserve the way of life that is existentially
important., 42 In our effort to preserve our way of life, according to
Schmitt, we may find it necessary to destroy someone else's and the ability
to do so is its own justification. According to the human capacities
approach, however, Schmitt's individual should refrain. He should
recognize reasonable limits to his own way of life, and these include not
41. NUSSBAUM, supra note 25, at 43.
42. CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OFTHE POLITICAL 27 (1976).
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impinging on the opportunity of others who do not share it to express their
capacities in ways pleasing to them. In other words, Nussbaum's approach
would surely blunt the sort of conflicts that Schmitt approves. The
difficulty lies in her inability to explain why the worth of others should be
embraced. Why should the worth of another individual dampen my
interest in expressing my capacities in ways that please me, regardless of
whether this causes suffering on others? By remaining strictly empirical in
her approach in order to avoid metaphysical complications, Nussbaum
seems to have left herself without the resources necessary to provide this
normative bite. Unfortunately, the lacuna is not merely philosophical but
deeply practical. Everyday persons must choose between paths of
realization that are selfish but potentially rewarding and paths that limit
their options on behalf of some communal good. A compelling
philosophical theory of moral choice must be able to explain why they
should take the latter rather than the former.
The third reason why a pluralist may be reluctant to accept
Nussbaum's approach focuses on her use of particular cultures to provide
content for particular forms of expression. This is disconcerting because,
when one looks closely at a way of life, the narratives that inform it are not
just about what values, in what order, to what extent, and under which
conditions, but why those values, that way, in such and such proportion,
then. The justification is intimately related to these other features, lends
them narrative coherence, and, above all, makes these features sensible
choices in the historical and cultural contexts in which they are operative.
Separating out the justificatory elements, so that the remainder may be
rewoven on a universalist framework leaves those persons with (perhaps in
reality but at least seemingly to them) arbitrary choices and a foreign
understanding of why those preferences are good or acceptable. For in
making the transition, practices and their meanings do not remain
unchanged. Indeed, there are many subtle shifts and some of the practices
that define a particular culture may now appear unacceptable,
embarrassing, and worthy of censure. And the reason for the changes -
the effect of "reasonable limits" - may have little or nothing to do with
what sustains the values or practices in the first place.
Consider, for example, how a group might understand the legitimacy
of the need to change, eliminate, or even just "tone down" a practice that
in the culture was handed down by God in a divine narrative that tells the
story of the group - all because it doesn't conform to the list of human
capacities and the need for their free expression. Nussbaum's strategy of
providing very general cross-cultural universals that depend on specific
cultures for content looks appealing, especially in the light of anticipating
the answers it provides to oncoming challenges from pluralists. But it gives
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considerable pause in the application. The metaphor of "pouring in"
specific content cannot conceal the fact that real constraints are imposed;
that these constraints are likely to be very foreign to those subjected to
them; and that the justification for doing so is, to say the least, difficult to
find.
Curiously, in the interest of creating a basis for shared understanding
and collaborative action, this approach generates a depiction of persons, of
their practices, and of their relation to others in which many may in fact
not recognize themselves as represented. Or if they are represented, in
ways that are distorted and that reflect the preferences of other, more
powerful persons. And the point, of course, is not only to produce claims
to which many or all involved may give consent, but that all may recognize
as a projection, at least to some extent, as an extension of their own way of
life and find compelling.
Fourth, the pluralist and relativist may wonder just how much work
this framework is capable of performing. The capacities approach is
promising because it sets forth reasonable minima that no person or group
may violate. This provides a decision-making procedure for determining
whether some practice is an acceptable one or not. Does the practice of
the one, or the group, impinge on the capacities of others to freely express
themselves within reasonable limits? Notice that this approach does not
ask the unhelpful question, does this action preclude some other's acting
or acting differently? This question is not illuminating because this sort of
thing happens all the time and is a necessary feature of persons and groups
making real choices among competing goods. These sorts of tradeoffs are
ubiquitous. They become pernicious only when some lose the ability to act
in other ways and this freedom is what must be protected. It marks the
difference between the culture that forces some women into the sex trade
industry and one that allows it as a free option. The latter is an
unencumbered exercise of practical reason, while the former violates theS 41
right to work as a human being.
This approach works when it is clear that someone or a group is being
subjected to a practice that they find disagreeable and they articulate their
unwillingness to participate. But what about cases where this is not clear?
Take for example the practice of "penis-feeding" in New Guinea. The
Sambia and the Etoro communities believe that in order for boys to
become men they must at a certain point be placed in an entirely
masculine environment. Part of this practice is the belief "that, in order
for boys to develop the qualities of men, they need to ingest male fluid or
43. This is not Nussbaum's example but it follows readily from her explanation of the list
of capacities. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 25, at 41-42.
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semen, much as we believe that young infants need their mother's milk or
some equivalent to be properly nurtured"." This commonly involves a
ritual where boys fellate older males, usually their uncles.45
Presumably, this practice would make those reared in the West
uncomfortable. But is it a practice that should be condemned? Under
Nussbaum's approach, we should ask whether it is a practice that is freely
entered into, or does it subject some members to activities that violate
their right to the enumerated human capacities? Assuming that no one
objects (neither those "feeding," those "fed," or other "onlookers" in the
society), how would one, as an onlooker, know this? More to the point,
how would those who actually participate know this? If it is true that
persons enculturated with the mores of a particular society learn to freely
express as their own choices those preferences borne by the community,
how would one discern the difference between a free choice of exercising
one's capacities in a particular way and a compulsory one? Wouldn't they
look to us, and even feel to them, indistinguishable? Would it be possible
to teach those persons how to make this distinction without fixing the
outcome in advance and according to our lights what their preferences
should be? On the other hand, suppose that someone did object (anyone
situated in any of the three possible positions). How should we understand
that person's rejection? Have their capacities for free expression really
been violated? That is, how do we know what rises to the level of a
violation? Is the practice really pernicious, or does the group have an
ingrate on its hands? What are the standards for this? And does it matter
whether or not the person making the objection understands his or her
refusal in the same way that we do (as a violation of human capacities)?
What if he or she is objecting for other reasons? (For example, a mother
may simply want to resist the practice of complete separation from her
child, but be largely indifferent to the practice of penis-feeding.).
The difficulty with the capacities approach is that it seems to offer
little guidance in resolving the very questions that it prompts us to ask.
The minima turn out to be very flexible boundaries and it is hard to
determine what falls within them, and what without. Consequently, the
approach seems to work in those "obvious" situations where it isn't
needed, but is unhelpful in those "hard cases" where it is.
Finally, the pluralist/relativist is not likely to share Nussbaum's
confidence that a concept of human capacities is useful in correcting
44. LAURIE SHRAGE, MORAL DILEMMAS OF FEMINISM: PROSTITUTION, ADULTERY, AND
ABORTION 126 (1994).
45. See generally GILBERT HERDT, RITUALS OF MANHOOD (1982): DAVID D. GILMORE,
MANHOOD IN THE MAKING: CULTURAL CONCEPTS OF MASCULINITY (1990).
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abuses. Nussbaum herself admits that the concept has been manipulated
and misapplied in the past. She only suggests that these are fragile and
vulnerable strategies, susceptible to criticism in light of a human capacities
approach. But how fragile are they? And are these the sort of strategies
to which the application of a theory of human nature would be helpful?
For particular context, consider the International War Crimes Tribunal's
efforts to address the crime of rape during the Bosnia-Herzegovina war. It
is estimated that some 20,000 rapes occurred, and Serbians perpetrated the
vast majority of these against Muslim women.46  In 1992, Serbian
television, in the interests of stirring up nationalism, aired what appeared
to be Muslims raping Serbian women and it was widely spread that
Muslims were committing a four-fold crime against Serbian women.
Muslims were intent on removing women from their families,
impregnating them, making them bear a stranger, and then taking the child
from the mother.
What is significant, for our purposes here, is that the Serbian
propaganda clearly recognized this behavior as criminal. It usurped the
use of women's bodies, violated their integrity, and subjected them to
several different and very painful forms of humiliation. It's clear that the
Serbian community recognized this as heinous behavior because that is
what made the propaganda powerful. And yet we have learned that this
representation accurately depicted events, not primarily (though to some
extent) of the Muslims, but in reverse - of the Serbians committing
atrocities against Muslim women. 4' The truly pressing question is: how is
this possible? How were members of the elite able both to recognize the
crime when perpetuated on their own, and enact it on others? While it is
surely beyond the purview of this essay to explain how this is possible, this
much may be discerned: moral weight is often placed differently depending
on who is acting, what the history of interaction between those
persons/communities has been and how those persons/communities
understand themselves and their prospective futures. These facts form a
narrative background against which differential assessment is made. As
Margaret Walker suggests,
A narrative of relationship is a story of the relationship's acquired
content and developed expectations, its basis and type of trust, and its
possibilities for continuation. A response may be owed to others
because some prior history of actual contact and understanding makes it
46. Todd Salzman, Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural, and
Ethical Responses to Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia, 20 HUM. RTS. 0. 348 (1998).
47. Id. at 353.
48. Id. at 354.
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reasonable for them to depend on me for something and reasonable for
me to know of their reasonable expectation. Then it is morally
important for us to acknowledge the past character, present state, and
future possibilities of the relationship. It shows us what is owed, why it
is owed, and what latitude there may be for postponement, substitution,
or release.49
Rights and obligations are not distributed wholesale, in discrete
packets. As Annette Baier pointed out, they are negotiated, reworked,
and sometimes dropped, depending on the situation. In the present case,
Serbians obviously did not see themselves as bound to respect the bodily
integrity of Muslim women. One way of making sense of this fact would
be to say that these persons inconsistently recognized the human worth of
women's bodies: Serbians cherished and respected their own women while
intentionally violating the women of a different culture. One might then
suggest that pointing out this consistency will go some distance towards
rendering what Nussbaum called a fragile strategy of self-deception.
But I suspect that this has neither empirical purchase nor much
promise as a response. What is at work here is not a duplicitous
application of a universal formula, but a complex set of valuations that
result from what is obviously a long and conflicted history between two
groups of persons. Serbians were able to justify this differentiation not
through duplicity (or what is much more suspect, the ascription of self-
deception), but by reference to a past history of violation and a deeply
uncertain and tenebrous future. One end the propaganda disseminated by
the Serbians served, was to explain why they were released from treating
others, specifically, the other group's women, in ways in which they would
expect their own women to be treated by strangers. The rationale that this
behavior is acceptable, because that is what they have already done to us, is
obviously a powerful one. It wasn't the violation of women in general that
they found so repugnant, but the violation of their women, and it is not
hard to see how this helps to set and re-inscribe evaluations that are widely
differential. It now makes sense to employ the same stratagem in reverse.
What this suggests is that it is not necessary to see those others as
inhuman, or as not qualifying for protection, but as human others who,
because of their actions, deserve to have this treatment visited upon them
(perhaps because they are human!). Consequently, what looks like self-
referential moral inconsistency by Nussbaum's lights, is in fact a consistent,
common feature of moral deliberation. For this reason, it is very difficult
to see how Nussbaum's approach is of any help here. Presumably she
would argue that it is never appropriate to treat another in this fashion,
49. WALKER, supra note 2, at 111.
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regardless of their history of action with regard to you. These would,
again, be the minimal constraints on expression articulated by the
capacities approach. But, again, without saying more, it is difficult to see
how that argument may be justified. One must not only recognize that
humans are intrinsically worthy, but that this is inviolable, subject to no
exception, and her approach clearly does not have the resources to insist
on this. At the very least, it is clear that such a framework is a
considerable imposition, not only in terms of content, but also in terms of
how people actually go about making moral evaluations. It is a far cry
from Nussbaum's representation of a framework for common agreement
that is neutral to the practices and expressions of particular cultures.
II. PLURALISM, INTERPRETATION, AND CRITIQUE
The last section looked closely at a recent universalist approach to
international rights in order to suggest some of the difficulties incurred by
theorists who employ this sort of strategy. In this section, I consider a
relativist's attempt to do the same thing. Unlike other essays on the
subject, I do not think the interesting question is whether or not cultural
self-criticism or inter-cultural criticism is possible. I take that as a fact, one
that shifts the traditional inquiry by focusing it on how this may be
accomplished without becoming the arbitrary expression of power. The
following effort is particularly relevant, because it is one of the few
attempts that both embraces strong pluralist/relativist premises and seeks
ground for reasonable criticism. The idea is that even granting pluralism
and relativism, there are still means available for constructing shared
norms that may in turn become the basis of internationally protected
rights. This has special appeal, because if successful it would avoid many
of the difficulties that Nussbaum's capacities approach incurred. I think
the approach fails in significant ways, but it highlights some important
obstacles that any response must overcome to be successful and further
clears the way for my own view.
A. Pluralism and Political Consensus
In Moral Dilemmas of Feminism, Laurie Shrage defends a pluralistic
approach to feminist moral theory. In place of methods that are reductive
and possibly ethnocentric, she offers a hermeneutical approach that
recognizes human diversity and the possibility of real incommensurability.
Her pluralism strives not for moral consensus among parties, but for
political compromise among competing alternative ways of living. Shrage
believes that she is capable both of providing resolutions to moral
problems like prostitution or "penis-feeding" and of defending herself
against charges of impotent relativism. While promising in terms of
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epistemic responsibility and moral constraint, Shrage's project flounders
repeatedly on her effort to seek compromise and set agendas. In seeking
political convergence, Shrage assumes a distinction between making moral
judgments "for us" and forming compromises among groups whose views
are at odds; she believes that the latter does not depend on or seek moral
convergence. But I will show that the project of political compromise
cannot be distinguished in this way and that Shrage's approach, as she
employs it, pursues, and even requires, moral convergence. Also, Shrage's
efforts to fashion political policies in response to moral dilemmas lead her
to make claims that are incompatible with her relativist position. I will
point out what some of these are and how they occur. This should more
than suffice to show that shared norms cannot be constructed in the way
that Shrage supposes, and that her approach is not a viable one for
constructing international rights.
According to Shrage, moral judgments of diverse human practices
cannot be responsibly made without thoroughly understanding the cultural
contexts in which they occur. This requires a hermeneutical method that
resists the temptations offered by positivist and objectivist accounts of
human knowledge.
On an anti-objectivist account, human creations and human behavior
reflect meanings and purposes that are neither exposed nor well
understood through objective description. Human creations and
behaviors are more like texts that require interpretation. Thus, instead
of a positivist approach that tries to reach a perspective on diverse
phenomena somewhat beyond a mere human one in order to generate
more objective understanding, an "interpretive" or hermeneutical
approach tries to see from within diverse human perspectives in order to
understand the intentional and symbolic character of human
phenomenon.
50
Rather than claiming knowledge of other perspectives through data
offered by the social sciences, Shrage urges us to understand human
practices in the terms of those who participate in them." In this way we
may gain "thick descriptions" for interpreting and evaluating the practices
of others. This approach does not provide the possibility of finding a
single, best, most rational answer with respect to social practices because
the meanings and purposes of other cultures are sometimes truly
50. SHRAGE, supra note 44, at 7-8.
51. Id. at 8-9.
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incommensurable with our own. But it does inform us of the contingency
of our own practices and of the wider range of extant human possibilities.52
The point of recovering the cultural self-descriptions of others is to
make us epistemically responsible. By gathering the insights of another
perspective we may not only learn to make moral judgments of others'
behavior, according to their lights (i.e. how they judge them), but see also
how they might respond to our moral norms. The intended effect is a
"decentering" of our own position. Reversing perspectives gives us a
critical angle of vision on ourselves. But their view is not taken "too
seriously" either. In recovering others' self-descriptions we do not simply
adopt their view as superior to ours, since this would amount to another
form of ethnocentrism.5 ' Rather, we continue to rotate perspectives. Each
self-description is susceptible to criticism from the other in an ongoing
manner.
Once we gain a critical awareness of ourselves and learn the
incommensurability of certain conceptions that others hold, we may begin
to make non-ethnocentric transcultural judgments. 54 Far from marooning
us in "vulgar relativism," i.e. one in which other cultures may only be
judged by their own lights, Shrage insists that real pluralism only restricts
judgment to particular situations and under specific conditions. Citing
Charles Taylor, Shrage writes:
Yet if we have recovered the perspectives of others without adopting
their perspectives, and have genuinely decentered some of our culturally
ingrained notions, then our transcuitural judgments will be relatively
free of cultural distortion, i.e., relatively free of ethnocentrism...
relativism involves a process of cross-cultural comparison that provides
the moral theorist with the sort of exposure to human affairs that can
engender serious criticism. It frees her criticism of the sort of distortion
and naivete that is present in the critic who has seen only one play and
one human way of playing.55
While we must use our own values in making transcultural judgments
of superiority, we can make them relatively free of cultural bias if we have
genuinely decentered ourselves by comparing cultures and reversing
cultural perspectives.
52. Id. at 9, 27. Shrage cites Clifford Geertz to this effect: "Understanding a people's
culture exposes their normalness without reducing their particularity .... It renders them
accessible: setting them in the frame of their own banalities, it dissolves their opacity."
53. Id. at 10, 22-24.
54. Id. at 24.
55. Id. at 27.
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Shrage freely admits that her pluralism is a kind of relativism. But she
claims it has distinct advantages over other mainstream accounts and
argues that it is not vulnerable to the charges habitually brought against it.
With respect to the former, she criticizes feminist accounts that are non-
pluralist and therefore non-interpretive. Moral theories that depend on
formalist methods (e.g. Selya Benhabib's) or single standards for
evaluation (e.g. care ethicists like Rita Manning) are, according to Shrage,
reductive accounts that are ultimately susceptible to charges of
56
ethnocentrism. This amounts to irresponsible and premature moral
criticism, in Shrage's opinion.
With respect to the latter, Shrage claims that relativism is neither
apolitical nor requires universal toleration. Rather, contra writers like
Kathryn Addelson, she claims it provides practical tools for setting moral
agendas. 7 Instead of moral convergence, which requires reductive
approaches and tends toward ethnocentrism, relativism seeks practical
18
compromise among divergent and possibly incommensurable views.
Shrage claims that it is a modus vivendi, a way to get along that both
respects incommensurability and guides political practice.
B. Compromise or Real Convergence in Disguise?
Shrage claims that, "By taking an interpretive and pluralist approach
to abortion and prostitution, we develop political agendas that express the
incommensurable values of differently situated social actors."59  In this
way, her moral theory turns on a distinction between political compromise
and moral convergence. But is she able to distinguish this project from
one that imposes a moral view? More importantly, does she actually stick
to this re-orientation in fashioning political policy? The answer to both
questions, it seems, is no. Engaging in sustained attempts at political
compromise, as well as the enduring task of reforming political practice in
accordance with agreements made, itself depends upon a judgment made
in light of moral values. In order to advocate this option (Shrage's), one
has to think it better to pursue political compromise rather than moral
homogeneity. If Shrage is correct in claiming that moral practices are
historically and culturally contingent, i.e. that there is more than one
human way of playing, then a community might think the important goal is
56. SHRAGE, supra note 44, at 12-21 (showing how Shrage both unravels Benhabib's
formalist version of discourse ethics to expose ethnocentricity and highlights dilemmas
incurred by the reductive approach employed by care ethics).
57. Id. at 14, 174-75 (for Addelson's criticism of relativism, its political implications, and
why Shrage disagrees with her).
58. Id. at 14, 169.
59. Id. at 169.
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neither having the "right, most rational" practice nor agreeing on a
practice we can live with despite incommensurate views. Rather, it might
be considered in some measure irrelevant which particular practice is
preferred, so long as moral consensus is achieved. Or, as seen above, it
might be that a group approves whichever practices are in reality the most
powerful. Considered this way, Shrage's injunction for political consensus,
which might at first seem natural and value-free, now appears as one
valued option among several possible alternatives.
More specifically, Shrage's own bias seems to share the
Enlightenment ideal advocated by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty. Mill
emphatically "recognized the necessity to the mental well-being of
mankind.., of freedom of opinion, and freedom of the expression of
opinion... ."60 But this pluralistic divergence of opinion did not extend to
political practice. The liberty of the individual must be limited to acts that
did no unjust harm to others. The common weal of mankind therefore
required, in Mill's view, both loose political convergence and freedom of
61personal opinion. Shrage's position approximates Mill's Enlightenment
view, one that is clearly rooted in the development of Western European
thought. But she fails to recognize this bias in her project when she
elevates political compromise over moral convergence. She claims that
"fashioning political policies that give each disputant part of what she
wants, without giving any party all of what she wants" 62 is the best chance
63for delivering non-ethnocentric judgments. By assuming that the
emphasis on compromise does not depend on a specifically moral
judgment, she does not see that she is actually requiring divergent cultural
groups to conform to a political practice whose values are rooted in
Shrage's own moral culture. To achieve her political agenda, all parties
must share the same ideal, namely the Enlightenment one of politically
"getting along" by restraining behavior within certain limits, while morally
believing whatever one prefers to be good.64 In this sense, Shrage's
60. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 50 (1978).
61. Id. at 53. See also JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 40-46 (1957). See also
RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 63, 196 (1989).
62. SHRAGE, supra note 44, at 43.
63. Id.
64. It is worth noting the extent to which Nussbaum and Shrage coincide in their
conclusions, despite the differences between their respective approaches. One appropriates
Aristotle and the other the recently fashionable hermencutic turn, but both reach a position
consistent with Western liberal contract theory: the autonomy of individuals must be
protected, with limitations thereon justified only on behalf of the common good. Compare
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10 (1971); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON
CIVIL GOVERNMENT 8 (1986). This understanding of the individual, the nature of rights,
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interpretive approach does not avoid ethnocentric judgment as she had
hoped.
Strangely, Shrage herself criticizes Selya Benhabib's formalist
approach to ethics precisely because it uncritically operates under
Enlightenment assumptions.
Benhabib's assumption that conceptual frameworks are commensurable
takes for granted a significant degree of cultural homogeneity, and thus
may obscure important differences between ourselves and cultural
others .... In short, Benhabib's communicative ethics belie the
Enlightenment conceptions of human selves and human reason
contained in the Kantian and liberal theories from which interactionist
universalism is derived."
But by embracing the Enlightenment ideal of political compromise,
Shrage exposes herself to her own criticism. Moreover, she may well be
guilty of imperialist ethics despite her claim that "interpretive and pluralist
ethics can promote the formation of non-imperialist, feminist practical
political agendas."' 6 Mediating divergent and possibly incommensurate
views under the auspices of political compromise compels even those who
do not share Shrage's political ideal of a modus vivendi to conform to her
ideal and reform their own moral practices, if not their beliefs, according
to its lights.
An illuminating example of this is Shrage's treatment of prostitution.
Prostitution poses vexing problems to the construction of shared norms for
a number of reasons. Not only is the practice widespread, across space and
time, but it also receives widely varying meanings and evaluations,
depending on where it is practiced and on how it is practiced within a
culture. In the West, it is broadly thought that prostitution is harmful and
psychologically damaging to the prostitute. But in his study of prostitution
in Nepal, Tom Cox concludes that because prostitution has the status of an
occupational norm, it does not cause this sort of damage. "Badi girls...
are not usually emotionally traumatized by prostitution. They are no less
(or more) happy than the rest of us. They accept prostitution as their fate,
and the limitations that may be placed on autonomy has proved an obstacle to the global
acceptance of human rights. As Peter Van Ness points out, "Most in the non-Western
world are determined not to let the United States impose its particular definitions of
democracy and human rights upon them, especially if that imposition tends to violate
central moral principles of their own cultural communities." PETER VAN NESS,
Introduction to DEBATING HUMAN RIGHTS: CRITICAL ESSAYS FROM THE UNITED STATES
AND ASIA 13 (Peter Van Ness ed., 1999).
65. SHRAGE, supra note 44, at 14.
66. Id. at 169.
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the only way of life open to them."67 Moreover, it is commonly thought
that aggressive solicitation by prostitutes indicates the desperation,
isolation, and even selfish behavior of the prostitution. But Luise White
found in her study of prostitution in colonial Kenya that such aggressive
behavior was characteristic of prostitutes who enjoyed their family's
sanction. They were working to support the family. Conversely, women
who were discreet, arranging private meetings with clients, were those
seeking personal gain and trying to distance themselves from family
relations and hierarchy.6 ' Given these sorts of variability, it is difficult to
see how any consensus with regard to prostitution may be achieved. And
yet, it is difficult to let go of the notion that prostitution is harmful, and
that its practitioners cry out for assistance and intervention.
In her discussion of the problem, Shrage begins by exposing the
inadequacies (biases) of other feminist accounts of the origin and nature of
prostitution, such as that offered by Christina Overall. 69  Next, she
decenters "our" notions of prostitution by comparing it to other forms
across space and time. Prostitution turns out, as we have seen, not to be
necessarily degrading or marginalizing, but only contingently so.7° Shrage
then evaluates "our" practice of prostitution in light of the hermenuetic
approach and finds that it contributes to pernicious myths that harm all
women and should be deterred." Consequently, she proposes a
compromise. Feminists and prostitutes alike think that prostitution should
be decriminalized. Shrage agrees, but in light of her concerns about the
effects of sex commerce (as our culture understands it) on all women, she
advocates regulations for prostitution. This is intended both to prevent a
laissez-faire climate for sex commerce from developing and to ultimately
deter the practice of prostitution." In the meantime, persons should
endeavor in various ways to improve the status of prostitutes and their
working conditions.
Recognizing the incommensurability of practices and moral
judgments, Shrage urges political compromise. It is a problem, however,
that Shrage avoids directly addressing the demands of those who actually
live "the life," although she claims that her ethnographic studies are drawn
67. ToM Cox, THE BAD: PROSTITUTION AS A SOCIAL NORM AMONG AN UNTOUCHABLE
CASTE OF WEST NEPAL 11 (1993) (on file with Harvard University).
68. LUISE WHITE, THE COMFORTS OF HOME: PROSTITUTION IN COLONIAL NAIROBI 20
(1990).
69. See SHRAGE, supra note 44, at 89-98.
70. Id. at 119.
71. Id. at 158.
72. Id. at 84, 158.
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in part from prostitutes and their advocates.73 She claims that the question
of prostitution is a problem for women, but does not distinguish between
two relevant and significantly different voices, i.e., prostitutes and non-
prostitutes. Addressing this gap in her study, exactly what are the
demands made, for example, by prostitutes in the United States and
Canada? It turns out that they want decriminalization, but no regulations.
In fact, they don't want to "make a deal" at all. They just want to be left
alone:
- And what we are basically saying is, let us take care of ourselves.
We're perfectly capable of doing it. We have been doing it for years
under the most distressing conditions .... We want to be able to work
and control our business and our lives by ourselves. 1
- My last word is: please, try not to let the government interfere in this
common market. 5
In short, the women for whom Shrage proposes regulations do not
appear to share her Enlightenment ideal of compromise; their bottom line
is both moral incommensurability and political autonomy to practice in
accordance with their view." Given this, the imposition of Shrage's
framework appears tantamount to the imposition of outside moral agenda
on the moral views and practices of prostitutes. Those in "the life," though
not amenable to this kind of intercession, have experienced it before:
"Don't pretend you're interested in our politics if you're only pimping
us... a number of outside groups have come in and tried to help in our
politicization. Ultimately they end up attaching a lot of their own agenda,
which means they redefine our issues for us. '77 Shrage assumes that in
seeking political compromise one can bypass moral convergence. In
practice, however, she imposes a moral convergence on at least one value.
73. Id. at 127.
74. Valerie Scott, Working Girls, in GOOD GIRLs/BAD GIRLS 179-80 (Laurie Bell ed.,
1987).
75. Margot St. James, The Reclamation of Whores, in GOOD GIRLS/BAD GIRLS, supra
note 74, at 86-87,
76. Interestingly, Nussbaum agrees with the prostitutes, not Shrage, even though she
thinks the practice generally pernicious for women. She writes that, "This does not mean
that we should not be concerned about ways in which prostitution as currently practiced,
even in the absence of force and fraud, undermines the dignity of women .... But the
correct response to this problem seems to be to work to enhance the economic autonomy
and the personal dignity of members of that class, not to rule off limits an option that may
be the only livelihood for many poor women and to further stigmatize women who already
make their living this way. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 25, at 297.
77. St. James, supra note 75, at 114.
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In doing so, Shrage precludes the possibility of those concerned from
realizing their most fundamental goal, that of moral and political
autonomy.
This prompts one to ask a more general question of Shrage's
approach. Is her emphasis on political compromise a re-orientation of
moral theory towards compromise or is it actually a theory of moral
convergence in disguise? The above discussion of moral convergence
guided by Enlightenment assumptions is the first clue that it is. Shrage's
discussion of prostitution offers others. First, although Shrage claims that
she is seeking political compromise for incommensurate views, she
provides strategies explicitly intended to achieve a feminist agenda. In
chapter four she says:
Given the cultural associations that exist between particular sexual
customs and particular sexualized, raced, classed, and gendered social
groups, feminist moral analysis of these diverse sexualities run the
danger of contributing to existing societal hostilities toward
marginalized social groups. This danger is one that any program for a
feminist sexual politics needs to consider."
Shrage then claims that prostitution is not always a morally
objectionable practice. Those instances that occurred in ancient Babylon
and colonial Kenya, for example, served valuable social interests and may
be approved] 9 But Shrage opposes prostitution in the United States and
offers specifically moral persuasion for her position. She claims that the
sex trade "is organized and reproduced by particular cultural beliefs about
sexuality, race, and gender"."" These beliefs serve to perpetuate not only
the sex commerce industry but marginalization of women and minorities as
well. Chapter six is devoted to identifying these pernicious beliefs and
tracing their relations both to sex commerce specifically and social
practices at large. For example, the culturally produced belief in the
fundamental dominance of men is reflected in the model of men as buyers
of sex commerce and women as sellers who please their customers.
81
Because these practices serve to harm all women, all women should
endeavor to deter prostitution."2 Although this is a specifically political
response, it is motivated by moral judgments that one should not sanction
practices that marginalize groups within a dominant culture. Where
exactly, one should ask, did these values come from?
78. SHRAGE, supra note 44, at 79.
79. Id. at 119.
80. Id. at 125.
81. Id. at 133.
82. Id. at 125.
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Shrage's compromise position, a strongly regulated decriminalized
prostitution, is ultimately not undertaken on behalf of finding a modus
vivendi for sundry groups with incommensurate views. Rather, her
position emerges from an agenda searching for compromises that will
facilitate the deterrence of marginalizing practices. Again, while
redressing the marginalization of groups within a culture may be a
worthwhile endeavor, it certainly stems from a moral judgment.
Moreover, it is a judgment that is explicitly Shrage's own and may not be
held by any of the concerned parties. More importantly, the
incommensurate views of concerned parties (e.g. those who wanted strict
prohibition and the prostitutes themselves who called for strict autonomy)
are actually subsumed by these "more significant" considerations of
Shrage's. It is convergence on these specific values that is sought, not
merely political compromise that respects value-pluralism.
Second, Shrage makes it explicitly clear that the goal of her feminist
politics is not enduring compromise but the eventual subversion of beliefs
she considers pernicious to women. Commerce in sex in the U.S. is based
on "social myths" that give prostitution its meaning. In order for
prostitution to continue without its harming women, these myths must be
transformed. 3 She opposes mere decriminalization (the actual demand of
the prostitutes) precisely because it fails in this regard: "Decriminalizing
prostitution, without putting in place any positive social regulations, is also
impractical for deterring prostitution, and it does not contribute to the
subversion of the pernicious myths that serve to organize it in American
society."8' The regulatory practices that Shrage suggests are intended to
undermine the beliefs perpetuating the negative image of the prostitute in
our culture. But they are also employed in an effort to deter her very
existence as a sex worker. 3 Shrage's "compromise" not only subsumes the
view of the prostitute under her moral position, it seeks to erase the
existence of this supposedly "incommensurate" position in its
implementation. In fairness to Shrage, she does place much emphasis on
transforming the symbolic understanding of prostitution and instituting
practices that elevate the prostitute's status. But should one recall the
demand of the prostitutes, he would realize that this too is unwanted
intervention, an intervention employed ultimately to reform the moral
beliefs of those around her. The weight placed on deterrence looks far
more like an effort at moral convergence that employs the techniques
offered by Shrage's hermeneutic approach to subvert "social myths" than a
83. Id. at 141.
84. SHRAGE, supra note 44, at 158.
85. Id. at 125, 158.
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political compromise respectful of the differing views of those who struggle
to live in accordance with them."6
C. Relativism Compromised
So far it has been shown that one cannot distinguish political
compromise from moral convergence in the way Shrage claimed. It has
also been suggested that her political proposals amount to moral
intervention. This section highlights specific ways in which Shrage's efforts
to fashion political compromise and trans-cultural intervention violate
premises of her interpretive approach and are incompatible with genuine
relativism.
In Shrage's model, individuals decenter themselves by recovering
"thick descriptions" of other, culturally alien practices. Although it helps
us learn something about how others understand their own practices, it is
primarily praised as a way to learn about ourselves. ' We learn more about
our practices and are constrained in our moral judgments of others.
Shrage claims that recovering thick descriptions allows one to take no
position as incorrigible, since each may be criticized from the perspective
of the other. And Shrage expresses confidence that this is sufficient for
making increasingly non-ethnocentric judgments and fashioning political
policy:
But Contra Benhabib, I would argue that an understanding and
appreciation of the virtues of incommensurable practices offers a
sufficient basis for these political agreements ... by relying on the
former basis for political compromise... we are much less likely to
deliver ethnocentric judgments.&8
In moving from moral judgment to political compromise, however,
Shrage assumes a privileged position that goes unacknowledged. Two
consequences inconsistent with her relativistic, interpretive approach
86. Shrage's brief discussion of surrogate motherhood could also be cited as exemplary
of her proposal's intention to restructure beliefs according to feminist political agenda. She
claims, "what makes the kind of surrogate contract we now have seem like an appealing
option to 'us' are the dominance of social perspectives that ignore the meaning of
pregnancy for women in the U.S., and the widespread social assumption that motherhood
has to be unambiguous and singular for effective parenting." Id. at 172. Shrage offers a
different version of surrogacy which will serve to subvert these beliefs. This may well be an
efficacious strategy to cope with the dilemma of surrogacy, but it is not a demonstration of
respect for a differing, contingent view. Shrage's approach is to install a practice which will
actual subvert the pernicious view which misrepresents the meaning of pregnancy for
women (a feminist enterprise). Id.
87. Id. at 179.
88. Id. at 43.
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ensue. First, relevant voices in the discussion are effectively covered over.
In Moral Dilemmas of Feminism, Shrage faults Benhabib for this very
reason: "Is not Benhabib obscuring the voices of actual Third World
women in her universalist condemnation of polygamy, while constructing
an imagined dialogue for First World feminist purposes?" 89 But Shrage
does no better when she moves beyond the constraints of her relativism in
fashioning political policy. In her case, the voices are First World, instead
of Third, is indeed heard in terms of self-description and moral
incommensurability. But they are heard specifically with feminist
purposes in mind. While voices may be heard in terms of description, they
fall on deaf ears in terms of political demands (which are made on behalf
of moral judgments expressed in those "thick" descriptions). For example,
although Shrage documents prostitutes' struggle for their own self-
descriptions, the demands of these women are not similarly attended in
Shrage's discussion. As we have seen, these are subsumed by her
endeavors to redress the pernicious myths associated with prostitution that
harm all women.
Second, Shrage takes the contents of these concerned views too lightly
in these debates to be consistent with the "thick descriptions" of her
approach. In becoming "ethnocentrically decentered" Shrage emphasized
that one cannot take a view (culture) "too seriously." But achieving
political compromise, despite Shrage's claim "that an understanding and
appreciation of the virtues of incommensurable practices offers a sufficient
basis for these political agreements,"90 is simply not the same as becoming
non-ethnocentric. To reach genuine compromise both the demands made
by those holding divergent views and the social, economic, and
hermeneutical conditions that constrain and give meaning to these voices
must be carefully considered and heeded. Her failure to do this indicates
that Shrage does not take reversing perspectives seriously enough in
moving toward compromise. (Indeed, she can't if she is to hammer out the
compromise she seeks). For example, Shrage's regulation solution
suggests that prostitutes be registered, be expected to pass college-level
courses, and even be trained to administer medical examinations to
themselves and possibly their clients. But if it is the case that women are
often forced into prostitution to maintain a minimal subsistence,
sometimes in their early teens, then how legitimate is it to expect
prostitutes to conform to these demands? What happens when they can't
or refuse? Do they lose the legal status of legitimate work and the legal
protections which accompany that status? Moreover, as Shrage suggests,
89. SHRAGE, supra note 44, at 16.
90. Id.
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we must consider how those persons are going to perceive "us" proposing
a transformation of "their" practices. In the case of surrogacy, for
example, how are we to expect would-be parents to react if told, as Shrage
suggests, that they must "share" their daughter/son with a heretofore
stranger?9 I think it unlikely that they will perceive the displacement of
social myths that do not adequately represent the experiences of women as
''more pressing" than their desire for a daughter "of their own." They will
instead perceive it as unwanted intervention from outsiders who have their
own priorities. In short, Shrage makes persuasive claims about the need
for epistemic responsibility in terms of learning the practices of others in
their own terms. But she then treats these terms as "social myths":
constructs that should willingly suffer reconstruction by way of
transformed social practice (political policy) on behalf of feminist goals.
The former tendency is consistent with her relativism; the latter is not.
The point of this discussion, of course, is not that Shrage fails to live
up to her own ideals. The point is that her efforts show that she cannot
remain true to her pluralist and relativist premises and still deliver political
compromise. In order to reach consensus, it appears that she must
compromise her commitments to real pluralism and relativism. The
approach was initially appealing because it held out the possibility of
political consensus without moral agreement, thereby eschewing the many
difficulties posed by trying to find universal ground common to all persons
and cultures. Such difficulties were the lesson of the section that focused
on the capacities approach to cultural universals. But the many obstacles
that Shrage faces suggests that her approach is no more attractive than
Nussbaum's for fashioning shared norms that may subsequently provide
the basis for international rights.
III. CULTURAL PLURALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS
The principal reason for reviewing the two approaches outlined above
is discovery. It uncovers shoals that any attempt to construct shared, cross-
cultural norms must navigate. The approach I advocate, in order to handle
these difficulties, is essentially a pragmatic one. In the first section below I
do some analytic work, distinguishing among different situations where
norms are contested, and suggesting that these situations place differing
demands on the struggle for normative agreement. In the second, I discuss
deliberative constraints that may be employed for producing agreement
and show how it avoids the worst of the errors highlighted above.
91. Id. at 173 (suggesting a compromise solution to problems of surrogacy).
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One difference between the foregoing approaches and this one,
however, should be noted at the outset. It is a common philosophical
assumption that consensus cannot be achieved unless there is something
shared in common that supports the agreement. In order for widely
divergent groups or cultures to settle on one opinion in the midst of
difference, there must be something else that they do share. In Nussbaum's
approach it is a common set of human capacities that need free expression;
in Shrage's it is the (supposedly) common recognition that compromise is
necessary if political agenda are to be set. In my view, no such
commonality is required even if it is to some degree sought. Strong
pluralism incorporates the empirical fact that cultures not only do different
things for different reasons, but also may agree to do the same or similar
things - also for very different reasons. Because this approach does not
require one ultimate justification that must be recognized as shared by
culturally distinct parties, all that is required is the same conclusion.
This helps address the issue in several ways. First, this sort of
agreement, which I call "overlapping consensus," neutralizes the ongoing
debate as to whether the concept of "human rights" is a peculiarly western
concept and whether its use constitutes a western imposition on other
cultures." There are a number of ways to achieve consensus on values and
behavior without requiring the same narrative of justification (however
tidy that would be). Since one common narrative appears to be
unavailable, it is best to settle for "consensual justification." In other
words, it doesn't matter what set of reasons buttresses a particular
agreement so as to be grounds for an international right, so long as there is
sufficient overlapping consensus with regard to the right to be protected.
Such justification is, of course, not ultimately non-question begging, in the
sense of not depending on contingent beliefs and practices. Indeed, it rests
on a potentially unlimited number of contingent beliefs. But this is not a
flaw - at least not a fatal one - so long as it provides agreement for setting
political agenda.
92. This refers to the question as to whether the concept is itself Western in nature. See
DONNELLY, supra note 4, at 50-65. It also refers to whether the content of what counts as
human rights is inevitably Western. "Traditionally the West has glorified the individual,
while manifesting a distrust for groups. As a result, first generation rights, for the most
part, have their origins in Western culture and the development of natural law." Linda
Butenhoff, East Meets West: Human Rights in Hong Kong, in DEBATING HUMAN RIGHTS:
CRITICAL ESSAYS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA, supra 64, at 104. I borrow the term
"overlapping consensus" from John Rawls, but free of his very particular meaning of the
term. All I intend is that there is general agreement about some values that should be
protected, even if the reasons why the parties think so diverge considerably.
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It is this common agenda that is captured by the notion of an
international right as that is defined in this essay. An international right
here refers to freedoms and entitlements that multiple groups agree must
be provided for individuals. Rather than a universalist approach, in which
a Right is granted to everyone, this is a multilateral approach. Rights are
built up piece-meal, contextually, out of agreements among interacting
groups. The difference between the two approaches is that one is the
obverse of the other. A universalist approach sets out a general right
applicable to everyone. It is necessarily vague, as Nussbaum points out,
and must gain content in particular circumstances. The pragmatic
approach takes content more seriously. It begins with particular norms and
extends outward, developing a more general reach. While it doesn't adhere
to the ideal of universality, it does struggle to make Rights as general -
that is, as widely applicable - as is possible given the differences in cultural
terrain. How general these rights are can only be learned as a result of the
inquiry and conversation, not at the outset.
Second, approaching the question of shared norms in this way
provides both a strategy for consensus building and a constraint on that
very process. It is a useful strategy for the obvious reason that it bypasses
the labor of finding something, one thing in common - a value, a
description of our situation, or a rule of decision making - and cuts to what
we can agree on despite the many differences. 93 The constraint comes
from the fact that the ends agreed upon, those norms that ought to be
implemented across cultures and provide the basis of international rights,
are only those upon which such agreement can be found. This may well
turn out to be significantly less than the domain of consensus sought, or
held out by, a more universalist approach. It nevertheless possesses the
virtue of eschewing ethnocentrism and imperialist ethics by refusing to let
hold of the particular differences of culture.
Third, this approach leaves open the door for considerable specificity
in terms of critique and intervention. As noted above, practices have
widely different meanings and even if those who participate in them
disapprove of their practice, those persons may desire a range of different
adjustments to the situation. In order to avoid the kind of imposition of
which Shrage is guilty - imposing foreign and unwanted solutions to
problems widely recognized - one must take these differences into account
and also honor them in practice when transforming a practice that
different cultures see as problematic for different reasons and want
different outcomes. I will show below how this is built into a pragmatic
approach to the problem.
93. See Sloane, supra note 7, at 59.
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A. Context Matters: How Different Types oy Situation Place Differing
Demands
Confronted by cultural relativism with regard to particular values and
their respective justifications, writers commonly seek non-question
begging reasons for normative claims that they value. Since it appears that
any justification somehow tied to a particular culture will fail to have any
purchase on the preferences of those encultured differently, it seems
necessary to develop a view that is essentially independent of any
particular culture. While it inevitably must be born somewhere, the view
should (somehow) not rely on any of the values that produced it if it is to
have compelling effect on cultures very different from its own. This is, in
some measure, the human nature approach. Although it originated in the
West, proponents argue that it is applicable to all cultures, regardless of
whether it shares other ideals embraced by Westerners.
This search for a non-relative position from which to adjudicate,
however, frequently involves a "forgetting" of the specific situations in
which the justification is supposed to prove compelling. This is
unfortunate because different situations place different demands on a
justificatory framework and significantly determine whether it is sufficient.
In the vast majority of cases, a less than completely non-question begging
framework suffices, so to the extent that we need justification, it is usually
in reach. Where it exceeds our grasp, there are two possibilities. One is
that it isn't necessary anyway, that it is only an excessive devotion to
foundational justification that prevents us from seeing that there is genuine
consensus. The other is that this fact, that we can't justify one way of life
over another, is an excellent sign of just that - that our way is unjustifiable
and so should not be imposed on others. If this is, then on one hand most
efforts to achieve consensus shoot at, and fail to reach, a goal that is
unnecessarily high. Aiming lower should help us overcome our anxious
need to produce this sort of theory and clear the way for genuine
consensus. On the other, we often respond improperly to failure in
reaching a foundational agreement. Rather than trying to find another way
to get to this type of agreement, we should understand it as a caution
against insisting on consensus at all.
It is now commonplace to insist that individuals can only know from
particular places, about the situations in which they find themselves, and
that this knowledge is inevitably limited, fallible, and subject to critique
from other positions. When questions of justification come to the fore,
94. See WALKER, supra note 15, at 57. See also VINCENT COLAPIETRO, The Ground of
Semiosis, PEIRCE'S DOCTRINE OF SIGNS: THEORY, APPLICATIONS, AND CONNECTIONS 137
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however, these epistemic facts recede into the background and argument
again takes a universalist form. But as the following points out,
"positionality" matters not only what and how we know, but also how we
explain - and what must be explained - in particular circumstances. To this
end, I identify four different contextual situations and their salient
features.
The first situation is one in which some members of "our"
community argue that our values should be held by others among us.
Some of us in a community in which other members substantially share
similar values seek to constrain the values and behaviors of others within
the same community. This may be done by appealing to still other values
that members hold, or to some decision-making framework that all already
recognize to some degree. By "decision-making framework," I mean only
some narrative that recognizes the relevance of particular values to the
community and justifies the choice of some values over others when they
conflict. Several features of this relatively internal situation are important.
One is that, even if members of a group share a good deal in common,
there still may be substantial disagreement about how to live and no self-
evident or non-question begging way of adjudicating among the choices.9
There is, in short, no need to suppose broad cultural incommensurability
to generate a problem with the same essential features as those that worry
Shrage and Nussbaum. The second is that there is often available a
decision-making framework - a court of last resort - that has broad
acceptance in the West, namely the liberal tradition in which only minimal
constraints on individual autonomy are permitted and the individual has
inalienable rights against social intrusion. This is, of course, a culturally
and historically contingent framework, dependent on a host of Western
assumptions about the nature of individuals, of rights, and of proper
governance. But in this situation it is often enough, since persons
advancing contending views already share it. The liberal approach rules
out some ways of life, as being intrusive, and frowns on persons who
116intrude on all the other remaining ways. It is also important to recognize
that this framework, or way of judging acceptable practices, is notoriously
difficult for Westerners to shed (as it was with Shrage in her consensus
(1996) (for a semiotic argument for perspectival realism); JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE
THEORY OF INQUIRY 109 (1991) (for insistence on contextualism).
95. It is common to assume in cross-cultural debates that individual cultures are
themselves homogeneous. This is of course mistaken, as a culture inevitably supports
internal differences, competing views of the good life, and ways of negotiating among them.
Situation one is important, if for no other reason, then for highlighting this fact.




approach). Since it ineluctably casts at least some light by which we in the
West appraise others, I think it best to assume this fact in developing a
tenable approach to handling charges of ethnocentrism in our judgments
and actions. We Westerners use this model while those enculturated
differently often use other ones; the question then becomes, how do we
achieve consensus, given these practical differences?
The second situation is where members of a given community argue
that members of a different community should constrain their values in
accordance with the first community's preferences. This takes the form of:
"they" should have to do what "we" do because what "we" do is "right."
This is commonly the situation in which persons (often elites) are haggling
over what norms are to be mutually recognized. What of course is lost
here is the comfortable set of background assumptions: although guided by
the Western liberal tradition, we cannot appeal to it to persuade others to
come over to our way of thinking and doing things. Without this, is there
anything left to do? Is there anything to which we can resort to guide our
actions? If the above discussion has exposed the difficulty of finding
something else in common, does the situation ultimately reduce itself to
crude relativism or the exercise of arbitrary power (as Schmitt insisted)?
While I think that there are options, these are epistemic in nature, not
moral or empirical. This is a model of collaborative inquiry and
deliberation that is coupled with the pluralistic constraints identified
above. This model, developed below, seeks both to make it possible for us
to genuinely modify our preferences and expectations in light of other
ways of living and make it possible to persuade others to modify their
views without inadvertently or forcefully compelling their compliance.
It is also an approach that is to be adopted by us in our encounters
with other cultures. This is an important point, because were this a model
that was imposed on all in a priori fashion, regardless of how they related
to us, then I would be making the same mistake Shrage made: in the
interests of producing some sort of consensus I would insist on the
acceptance of values and methods that others do not already share. It is
tempting to do this, because, seen from a bird's eye view, it may appear
necessary in order to generate agreement. But it isn't necessary and this is
where remembering and remaining within the context is crucial. We cannot
forgot our position and what we need is, setting out from our cultural self
understandings and understandings of others, a way to produce agreement
without imposing our understandings on those others. That agreement
does not require common assumptions; it need only be freely agreed upon
by them in accord with their way of life and their preferences.
The third situation is one in which members of our community seek to
justify intervention on behalf of another community or sub-community
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against a third group or community. This is the situation most commonly at
issue when international rights are invoked. We may feel provoked to act,
for example, to mitigate the practices of prostitution or female
circumcision; we may want to intervene when we witness the acts of the
Taliban or Serbian nationals; we may suspect that foreign elite is
excessively exploiting the labor and resources of an impoverished
underclass. In situations like this, there is often substantial agreement
between those intervening and those benefiting from the act. The
difficulty lies in providing justification to those who suffer the intervention,
that is, those whose acts of cruelty or exploitation are curbed. In some
sense, this is the situation that drives the philosophical enterprise to
extremes. Faced by those who disagree with us and resent our intrusions,
we feel compelled to give reasons that they will find convincing - indeed,
that they will have to accept because rational (but non-coercive). Two
observations are in order here. First, the justification for our intervention
does not come from an encounter that looks like situation two above. It
comes from the more obvious source that persons or groups who are being
exploited or abused by those who disagree with us are soliciting it. Rather
than elites arguing about what norms should be posted, this is commonly a
situation in which some relatively empowered group seeks to protect
another group that is somehow impuissant in the face of a third, relatively
stronger group. Second, the conditions and potential for reaching
agreement with those whom we oppose are essentially the same as
situation two above. The need to reach consensus here, however, is
considerably different and likely not even necessary. This is best seen
when the situation is inverted. Here one supposes a situation in which the
acts of group A on group B are found to be hurtful, etc. by group B (the
victim) and by group C (which is in the position of onlooker), and still
holds out the possibility that the acts of group A are really acceptable after
all. That is, it suggests that the justification of A for their acts really
outweighs any grounds B and C has for objecting, even if they are in
agreement as to its pernicious character. This of course presumes not
moral relativism, but the superiority of one way of living over two others
and the absence of any need of that way of living to justify itself to others -
even those whom they injure. It is difficult to imagine why the burden
should be on B and C to justify themselves rather than vice versa, or why
this situation should give us much pause in making judgments or offering
intervention on behalf of exploited groups. At the very least, the onus
should be on the aggressors to explain why our actions are unjust, not on
us to justify our acts.
Moreover, this situation offers crucial opportunities for discerning
cross-cultural agreement. When passively looking on to a culture,
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judgments about their practices are hazardous. It is unclear what
disagreement or disapproval reflects. It may suggest something about
them, namely that some of their practices are suspect, or it may indicate
our own culture contingencies - that given our history and preferences, we
wouldn't do things as they do them. But in this situation, in which two
very differently situated groups agree with respect to the activities of a
third group, our views are substantiated. Agreement here does not mean
that our views really were right after all, or that our way of justifying those
values is the better way or even that those others share that manner of
justification. It just means that we agree, and that there may be a number
of reasons for not accepting some given practice or set of acts. Judgment
remains contingent, and it continues to rely on respective cultural
narratives for its justification; nevertheless, there is real agreement and this
is genuinely all that is needed for carving out shared norms.97
Lest this sort of agreement appear too thin, it is important to notice
several features of its occurrence. First, whereas Nussbaum has difficulty
in providing normative grounds for her view (beyond an initial
assumption), this sort of consent is rife with obligation. Each party to the
agreement has an abundance of reasons for joining in, drawn from its own
culture. Each has reasons for joining that are compelling to him, including
reasons why he should agree. Unlike Shrage, who has her reasons for
imposing compromise from without, in this scenario these emerge from
respective cultures and may well significantly differ from party to party.
This difference means that the agreement is seen by each as a significant
extension of that party's way of life. It may be seen, as it often is in the
West, as accepting minimal constraints on autonomy, but it certainly need
not be.
97. My approach resembles that suggested by Abdullahi A. An-Na'im and Charles
Taylor, to the effect that we must accept pluralism and rely on the resources that each
provides for justification in order to achieve shared norms across cultures. See Abdullahi
A. An-Na'im, The Cultural Mediation of Human Rights: The Al-Arqam Case in Malaysia, in
THE EAST ASIA CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 147 (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell
cds., 1999). See also Charles Taylor, Conditions of an Unforced Consensus in Human
Rights, in THE EAST ASIA CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 144. But there are
differences. Rather than relying on multiple cultures to avoid crude relativism, I suggest
looking to the actual practices that these views legitimate and how those persons who
participate in them regard the practice and the justification. So in one instance I draw on
the differences to give different grounds for general consent, but in the next - and this is
the crucial aspect - draw on the internal features of a culture to substantiate criticism of
those practices and their legitimacy in order to bridge cultural differences and provide
cross-cultural criticism. Tersely put, cross-cultural judgment gains warrant when those in
the culture agree with the judgment, whether for same or different reasons.
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Perhaps more importantly, norms constructed in this fashion
significantly derive their content from the parties themselves. Unlike a
human nature approach, which introduces a set of values along with a very
particular narrative of justification, this way of going about things allows
those values - that is, the content of these shared norms - to emerge from
the participants and still retain their reasons for being embraced.
Naturally what is agreed to is some subset of what all would accept, since
there is difference, and the reasons for holding that subset would vary
significantly. And the application of these norms must differ depending on
where they are applied. But not only is this not problematic in theory, it
closely reflects, if Annette Baier is correct, the way in which we actually go
about this activity in practice. As she writes, "Human beings are not
merely claimants and contestants, we are plea bargainers, compromisers,
fixers, and adjusters."98  The fact that the preferences expressed by
particular groups must be curtailed in the face of interaction with other
groups is not a specifically Western phenomenon; how we go about
making those tradeoffs is. The key to avoiding the sort of ethnocentrism
that worries Shrage is to recognize, and honor, that others go about this
differently and to focus on the result, not the means by which it is done.
The last situation is more difficult and leads to a different result. It is
triadic like the previous one with one essential difference: we find some
practice troubling, but both those who do it and those who endure it offer
no objection. The practice of prostitution in Nepal is a good example. If it
is true that "Badi girls.., are no less (or more) happy than the rest of
us, 99 then how can we disapprove of it? How can there be a shared norm
that protects women from this practice, if they are content in it? What
basis would there be for an international right not to be assigned to a caste
that included prostitution? In fact, there may be no such basis. But this
surely does not mean that nothing may be done. First, there is an abiding
suspicion that things are not what they seem in such examples. Are they
really just as happy? Does the fact that they have no other way of life
open to them make a difference? In short, a good deal more information
is needed about the conditions those persons face and the sources of our
knowledge about those conditions. Second, intervention comes in degrees,
not wholesale. While it may be inappropriate in this situation to interfere
in a practice in Nepal, it doesn't mean that real options cannot be provided
to those persons. For example, asylum may be offered to those who
indeed are not so happy with the life of prostitution - or at least unhappy
enough to leave. This would increase their range of choice and give us
98. BALER, supra note 22, at 228.
99. Cox, supra note 67, at 11.
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some indication of how those persons really regard the activity (making it
more like situation three above). It is one thing to embrace a way of life
when none other is available, an entirely different one to cling to it when
alternatives present themselves.
To insist on this sort of choice is not to impose Western views. It does
not impose a specifically liberal framework, a Western view of the self, or
characteristically Western choices about which values should have
relatively more protection in comparison to others. Rather, this is a
situation where some group enculturated in ways significantly different
from ours suggests to us that their choices are freely chosen and embraced
by their members, by all of them, even those whom we sense are being
misused or exploited by an elite. In this case, we only ask whether this is
really so, whether, given their way of life, those persons for whom we
express concern would really continue those practices. Given some choice
would they choose differently? Offered a free and open encounter,
without reprisal, would they not signal some disapproval for the practice?
If this happens, if real choices are present and they freely speak their
consent, then it is not difficult to settle, in this instance, on cultural
incommensurability. In this case, there would be a way of life, so foreign
to us as to be unintelligible, in which human others flourish.
Finally, presuming that cultural incommensurability of this sort does
occur, such differences may well serve a useful purpose. Shared norms, if
they are to prove the backing of international rights, must be sensitive to a
great deal of differentiation in practice. They must recognize that not all
forms of a practice are pernicious, while some are especially so, and find
ways to preserve the former while eradicating the latter. In other words,
confronted by this sort of genuine incommensurability, we should not seek
a theory that can somehow overcome it, but rather develop methods that
honor those differences in practice. In those few, perhaps very few,
circumstances that reflect this situation of disagreement, considerable
caution should be the order of the day. It must be recognized that, though
we may promulgate a right to be free of the slavery that is called
prostitution, there may well be practices extant that, given the context in
which it occurs, does not count or rise to the level of an instance of this sort
of slavery. Rather than undermining the construction of international
rights, pluralism and a strong sense of relativism, when properly regarded,
may make these rights and their applications accountable to cultural
specificity. Pluralism teaches us to carve rights carefully, so that we get at
the practices that truly are pernicious for those subjected to them, without
under the guise of good intentions stigmatizing or rooting out practices
that bring genuine happiness to the participants.
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B. Some Epistemic Guidelines for Producing Less Constrained Consensus
The above classifications suggests that situations two and four serve
up the most difficulty in producing consensus for the kind of shared norms
that may ultimately provide support for internationally protected rights.
When there is general disagreement about the value of a practice, how are
we to determine whether that disagreement reflects innocuously different
choices about how to live or indicates that it is truly an undesirable
practice, one that should be censured and even resisted? If there are no
neutral values or neutral decision-making procedures, then how does this
not reduce to a question of who is more powerful?
First, it is important to notice that this is not, at least initially, a
problem of moral relativism (the cultural incommensurability question),
nor a metaphysical issue (the human universals question), but an epistemic
one. Morally problematic situations arise when it becomes unclear what
values should be produced, what practices embraced. This fact sets a
specifically epistemic task for inquiry with regard to the nature of the
situation. While experience and choice may be individual or specific to a
particular group, this sort of knowledge is not. A fully adequate
understanding of "what is the case" demands that all those relevantly
involved render an account of events.1 ° This is a shared narrative in and
through which individuals understand developing events and their own
actions in relation to others and the occurrences in which they are
participants. Such narratives are inevitably partial and in situations where
real cultural differences are at work, such narratives naturally reflect the
preferences borne of enculturation. Only in dialogue with others present,
but differently situated, can personal or group experience be confirmed,
corrected, and complemented. Discourse furthers understanding because
various accounts both overlap and diverge. The view of each may be
checked through recourse to other persons and to existential conditions
that in turn further qualify the account. l° The understanding of all
100. As Dewey writes, "Knowledge cooped up in a private consciousness is a myth, and
knowledge of social phenomena is peculiarly dependent upon dissemination, for only by
distribution can such knowledge be either obtained or tested." JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC
AND ITS PROBLEMS 138 (1988).
101. There is a large amount of literature that develops the problem of bias and authority
in communal representations and offers various solutions to it. See, e.g., GEERTZ, supra
note 8, at 21-54 (reviewing four approaches taken by anthropologists to handle the
distortive effects of authority in representation along with the difficulties that each incur).
See also REISMAN, supra note 15, at 102-47 (discussing the peculiar features and difficulties
of speaking across power differences). My claim here needs only be a weak one: such bias
may be progressively eliminated and any going representation, recognizing that there is
some distortion, is acknowledged to be a fallible one, subject to further correction through
dialogue. As Dewey suggests, "Discussion, as the manifestation of intelligence in political
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improves as narratives are freed from arbitrary bias and refined in the
details by complementarity.
This sort of communicative inquiry contours the features of the
situation. It does not go any distance toward determining moral questions,
such as which values are better or how decisions like this are to be made.
Nor does it do what Shrage had hoped for. It does not allow us to make
non-ethnocentric claims about other cultures by "reversing perspectives."
It uncovers the values, practices, and habits of interpretation manifest in
the situation. And it reveals precisely what sort of situation we are in, i.e.
which of the types of situations outlined above we face. Confronted by the
practice of prostitution in Nepal, for example, it only demands that we
listen to all those who have a stake in the practice, including their
expressed preferences, as well as why those persons believe as they do, in
our representation of the situation. It may be that "we" are made
uncomfortable by it, while those who do it, those who frequent them, and
those who are aware of it within the respective culture think it everyday
and intrinsically worthy of neither praise nor blame. The point in doing
this is to assess very carefully what is shared, what is not, and why not - all
from our point of view.
Communicative inquiry also seeks to define through dialogue with
those undergoing the practice exactly what about it is disturbing or
offensive. Even when a high degree of consensus is reached concerning
the situation, individuals and communities do not always agree on what is
problematic about it.'02 Because persons and communities have distinctive
moral self-understandings, histories, and trajectories, events often have
divergent significance among those implicated. What is at stake in the
situation cannot be isolated from other values and practices to which the
individual is committed. In the case of prostitution in colonial Kenya, for
example, only certain sorts of prostitution were frowned on. Women who
participated in the sex industry in order to support their families were not
only tolerated but gained approval. On the other hand, those who
engaged in discreet encounters were regarded a threat to the family and it
is this practice which elicited blame. This suggests that what will count as
an acceptable solution to those involved is in part determined by how one
understands the problem and what other values are already at stake. What
is most important to see here is that the nature of the problem, just like the
nature of the description, must be part of the communicative discourse if it
life, stimulates publicity; by its means sore spots are brought to light that would otherwise
remain hidden." John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, in ExCELLENCE IN PUBLIC
DISCOURSE 129 (1986).
102. See DEWEY, supra note 94, at 108.
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is to avoid being ethnocentric in its pronouncements. In order for us to see
what it problematic about the practices of others, it is crucial that we
understand what those others find problematic about them. This
knowledge is necessary if a solution satisfactory to all involved is to be
achieved.
Second, available solutions to problems must be developed and
implemented through communicative interaction. Persons involved in a
situation have distinctive understandings of what the situation calls for
because of personal experience and expertise. One person or group may
have direct knowledge of the problem but no resources for its resolution.
Another may have expertise in that he sees possible resolutions others do
not. Each has partial knowledge but only together can the situation be
satisfactorily resolved. Together, adequate resolutions may be developed
that sufficiently answer the problematic situation as those involved
understand it and in such a way that it secures or cultivates those values
considered decisively important.
Engaging in this sort of communicative inquiry leaves open
considerable room for failure. First, groups may not agree that a practice
is harmful. If this fact persists, despite the discussion and the constraints
discussed above in the context of situations two and four, then failure to
agree is a sign (though a non-dispositive one) that there is real
incommensurability at work and so neither judgment should be made nor
act implemented. This appears threatening, but I submit that it is so rare
in practice, that we can afford to be fallible at least to this extent.
Third, even if they do agree that it's harmful, they may have different
reasons for thinking so, and so see different features as problematic. This
would again be cause for limiting implementation of a norm. Either
nothing done, or only so much that may be agreed upon, would appear
acceptable. This would be more prevalent than the last situation, but also
more salutary. It allows the particular features of individual instances to
constrain judgment and action so that one group does not surreptitiously
decide what is an appropriate way of life for another. Moreover, in this
context, in which we are willing to assist others in their resistance of some
practice being perpetrated on them, there is no reason to want to help
them beyond the limits that they themselves desire. We may be puzzled by
where they stop, but can identify this as the sort of incommensurability
that compels us to stop short of where we might ourselves go.
Beyond these two limiting possibilities, however, lies much
undiscovered country for agreement in both judgment and normative
constraint. There is room for, and indeed there has been, broad acceptance
of norms that have achieved the status of internationally protected rights.
When these are recognized as the overlapping agreement of culturally
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diverse parties, emerging from and sustained by widely differently
narratives of justification, and not subject to the suspicious situations
highlighted above, they may be regarded as free of charges of
ethnocentrism and "imperialist ethics." This is not to say that they defeat
the relativist or the pluralist. On the contrary, the concerns of both are
incorporated, seen as a source of strength and means for refinement in the
implementation of right. But their concerns need not subvert either
consensus or our confidence that such agreement is freely achieved.
IV. BACK TO THE ROUGH GROUND
As indicated at the outset, human rights are internationally
recognized among states and have become a staple of political discourse.
Accusations by one state that another infringes on the human rights of its
citizens are not taken lightly, as they may signal significant losses of
political capital among other members of the international community.
Moreover, it is also often on this level that cultural pluralism may be
invoked as a defense: a state may well say, with some plausibility, that
charges of abuse are unfounded; that disagreement between two states
reflects the difference between their respective values and practices, not
the exploitation of some members of a community by other members; and
that interfering in those practices amounts to a kind of cultural imperialism
and unchecked ethnocentrism.
1 0 3
This may not, however, be the most common, or most important, level
at which international rights operate to protect the lives of individuals
subject to a wide range of cultural, political, and even natural conditions
around the world. Although political exchanges among state elites draw
attention and sometimes have dramatic effect, it may be no less important
to secure international rights for the purpose of legitimating international
courts. And while these institutions are no doubt political in their right,
they operate differently, that is, they fall into a different category among
those delineated above. I conclude this essay by highlighting some of the
differences between the two.
It is not difficult to see that argument among elites of different states
broadly reflects situation two. It occurs when "we" want "them" to do
things differently, and they heartily disagree. The deliberative model
suggested in section three above helps, not because it will lead to
agreement - something I do not think it wise to depend on a theory to do -
but because it shifts the problematic. It nudges the question out of a moral
dead end (is our practice, compared to theirs, better/right?) and sets an
103. See generally, VAN NESS, supra note 64.
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empirical task. It makes sure that those involved represent their situations
and needs, instead of relying on stories told by elites who stand to profit
from misrepresentation. It does this, in some measure, by forcing a
situation two into choosing between a situation three and situation four (as
outlined above). Do those who participate also share the view of the elites
who are defending a practice to other elites who do not share it? The
answer will not provoke agreement, but rather provide a clue to whether
we are justified in taking action.
Obviously, the suspicion is that in many or most cases what looked
initially like cultural pluralism and incommensurability will, when the
smoke clears, reveal exploitative relations. In other words, we will end up
being right in judging some practices unacceptable and, in the rare case
that this doesn't happen we can be largely content to refrain from
interfering. Epistemically fallible, we can afford to be reluctant to rush in,
lest we tread on a valuable but fragile cultural practice. No doubt, there
will be situations where we are tempted to intervene anyway, and when we
do so, besides taking responsibility, we may see this as an opportunity for
further inquiry. It may subsequently turn out that those whom we
"invaded" are grateful after all, or they may resent it a great deal. If the
former, we will feel the wiser, and if the latter, then we can withdraw with
apologies and reparations. Regardless, and this is the important general
point, situations like this (resembling situation two, then three or four)
must incorporate concern for cultural pluralism in order to avoid
undesirable imperialism. But given the very thin constraints suggested in
section three, not only is it rare that this problem will confront us, but (and
this is crucial) we are very likely to know when it is a legitimate possibility.
Rather than a blind elephant, in most cases, if we have been empirically
diligent, cultural imperialism will be a recognizable risk and, depending on
the broader context of the situation, may be one worth running.
Conversely, if the argument between elites is unlikely to lead to a
violation of cultural pluralism, then the likelihood that activities of an
international court will do so is almost nil. One reason to think this is that
the sorts of situations that look problematic, such as penis-feeding
(discussed above), lie well beyond the focus of international rights.
International lawyers may well be more concerned to protect the right to
life, or the right to be free from torture, than with the culturally
idiosyncratic practices of the Sambia or Etoro. Such examples, precisely
because they are so eccentric, artificially drive the discourse toward
relativism and needlessly compromise our efforts to protect core rights.
And if a practice does happen to appear controversial in this way, the
international lawyer and her court can pass it over; there are plenty of
other, far more obvious violations demanding attention.
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The difficulty with this claim is not that it isn't true - it surely is - but
that it does not go far enough. On one hand, it doesn't provide a
principled distinction for identifying those practices which should be
addressed from those which should be protected. It doesn't tell us the
difference between a situation in which a practice is so idiosyncratic that
an international court will pass it over and one in which a practice is
regarded as idiosyncratic because the court passes it over. It also doesn't
explain how we know a particular event qualifies as an example of a
violation of a core right from one that doesn't. It doesn't address the
question of whether it's a violation because it really violates the norm, or
because the court claims that it does (a version the old Socratic question
of, is it good because the gods love it or do the gods love it because it is
good?). Consequently, with only this to go on, it is difficult to tell whether
or not ethnocentrism is in fact at work in a particular situation. On the
other hand, this approach fails to cast the normative "net" broadly enough.
The fact that a practice lies outside what many regard as core examples of
violation does not by itself tell us whether the practice deserves scrutiny.
Penis-feeding is certainly idiosyncratic, and the pragmatic allocation of
scarce judicial resources surely encourage courts to address more
mainstream acts, but this says nothing about whether or not penis-feeding
should be approved by an international community. It is at least not
enough to say that we are not guilty of ethnocentrism only because we only
intervene in practices that we recognize as highly violative of our way of
life; for there may be no less an obligation to intervene - or rather, assist -
others who suffer greatly from practices we don't think of central
importance but which significantly affect the participants. In other words,
what counts as central or worthy of attention again opens the door for the
arbitrary determination of an ethnocentric culture and may lead to a
failure to help.
Fortunately, more may be said. First, it should be noted that this
general situation usually falls under the class of situation three as outlined
previously. This is a situation in which "we" seek to intervene in the
practices of a given cultural community by assisting some members of that
community over and against other members of that community. Court
intervention resembles this situation because a court's attention is brought
to bear by the petition of a participant party. For example, W. Michael
Reisman points out that in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
"A case begins on receipt of a petition alleging a violation of human
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rights."'' 4 The case is then subject to threshold requirements, such as
having names, signatures, and allegations of facts that tend to establish a
rights violation.0 5 While these requirements may vary, the point here is a
simple but important one: inquiry by the court (a type of intervention)
goes forward when members of some community object to treatment by
still others in their group and respond by appealing to an international
community for assistance. Consequently, it appears that it isn't possible
for a problem of cultural pluralism to get started in this situation. There is
indeed intervention; but because it is invited by some subset of the culture
in question, it is clear that neither situation two nor the really problematic
situation four is operative. In fact, the minimal requirements I suggested
as a pragmatic agreement have been met: a party, finding some act or set
of acts objectionable, alleges facts that the international community
recognizes as a violation. Why those facts are objectionable may well vary
among the parties; but in order for the court to get moving there is the
minimal agreement that they are violative, and this, initially at least, is all
that is required.
A different sort of problem remains, however. To the extent that the
international community has an explanatory framework different from
that of the various cultural groups that may appeal to it, there may be a
gap between what the international community will recognize as violative
and what members of a particular community may want them to recognize.
For example, the Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
in Independent Countries recognizes the rights of these peoples to their
own customs and institutions, but only "where these are not incompatible
with fundamental rights defined by the national legal system and with
internationally recognized human rights."' ' It is not difficult to imagine a
situation where it is unclear whether an international court should
intervene (is it incompatible or not?) or situations in which an
international community refuses to accept the protest of an indigenous
community that some practice is acceptable among those who participate
in it. And this may well be a form of cultural imperialism, since it amounts
to a refusal to protect some practices in lieu of others.
The best available solution to this sort of difficulty, I suggest, is again
the model of communicative inquiry. This approach opens the possibility
of allowing those whose practices we may want to protect, even though we
104. W. Michael Reisman, Practical Matters for Consideration in the Establishment of a
Regional Human Rights Mechanism: Lessons from the Inter-American Experience, SAINT
LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 89, 92 (1995).
105. Id.
106. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries
(No. 169) June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382, 1386.
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fail to understand or approve of them, to show that these activities are
central to their way of life. So long as they can do so, without also
revealing ways in which others are subjected to deleterious effects of those
practices, we may well agree to recognize them and intercede when they
are identified as having been violated. If it turns out, however, that a
group's practices turn out to be non-innocent in the sense of imposing on
others an undesirable way of life, we are again fully justified in refusing to
recognize those acts. Why? Because here situation three is recursively
applied. In a situation where some subgroup (A) wants us to intervene on
their behalf against a dominant group (D), we may find that that subgroup
champions a practice that yet another, further subgroup (B) is
compromised by. Consequently, (B) may well appeal to us to refuse to
allow this and we may be justified in refusing to intervene against (D) on
(A)'s behalf because this amounts to an intervention on behalf of (B). If
this is so, then communicative inquiry - which, again, is an epistemic task,
not a moral one - allows us to determine more precisely just how widely
our normative net should be cast and what justifiably falls outside of it.
Again, this is a fallible process, but as I hope to have shown, one much less
likely to be subject to cultural imperialism than it may have at first
appeared. It at least gives some ground for confidence in the legitimacy of
international rights and their implementation in international courts. What
those rights are, of course, is a function result of this process. While we
may still speak of a Right, this is not an a priori claim, universally applied,
but one resulting from collaboration and communication.
V. CONCLUSION
This essay differed from its predecessors in several ways. One is that
it understood the claim of cultural pluralism in a far more robust way than
it is usually conceived. Rather than thinking relativism itself crude, it
regards common representations of relativism as crude representations.
This is seen as problematic, as it seems unlikely that a responsible solution
to the difficulties that cultural pluralism imports for the articulation of
international rights will come from an attenuated understanding of what
cultural pluralism is. Also distinct was the response this essay offered:
instead of dissolving the problem of pluralism by somehow showing that it
isn't really a problem after all, it identified a place for cultural pluralism in
our approach to formulating and implementing international rights. At the
very least, so it held, pluralism demands caution in the form of moral and
epistemic fallibilism. It also suggests that some methodology, such as the
one offered above in section three, is needed. Although one cannot ever
be absolutely certain that one's acts are not guilty of cultural imperialism,
2003]
418 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. [Vol. 10.2
the burden of most of this essay was to persuade the reader that these
occasions are rare, sometimes extremely so, and that the observation of
some procedural safeguards makes them rarer still. The problem of
cultural pluralism, at least with regard to charges of cultural imperialism, is
greatly exaggerated in most instances and this means that considerable
confidence in our ability to fashion international rights is warranted.
Properly understood and regarded, cultural pluralism, rather than
undermining such claims, refines and contours them. Pluralism reminds us
that there are many ways of living and that responsibly protecting those
that are worthy of preserving requires much attention to details and
differences. The task is fallible and ongoing, but not impossible.
